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a b s t r a c t
Java interface types support multiple inheritance. Because of this, the standard bytecode
verifier ignores them, since it is not able tomodel the class hierarchy as a lattice. Thus, type
checks on interfaces are performed at run time. We propose a verification methodology
that removes the need for run-time checks. Themethodology consists of: (1) an augmented
verifier that is very similar to the standard one, but is also able to check for interface types in
most cases; (2) for all other cases, a set of additional simpler verifiers, each one specialized
for a single interface type. We obtain these verifiers in a systematic way by using abstract
interpretation techniques. Finally, we describe an implementation of themethodology and
evaluate it on a large set of benchmarks.
© 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
The Java platform is one of themost widespread frameworks for building and executing software applications. It is based
on the Java programming language [14], which is an object-oriented strongly typed language, and on a cross platform
environment, called Java Virtual Machine [20] (hereafter referred to as JVM). Programs written in Java are compiled into
an intermediate partially typed language, called bytecode, that can be directly interpreted by the JVM. Bytecode instructions
manipulate an operand stack and a set of registers. Java compilers perform many checks to ensure type correctness of the
generated bytecode. To speedup execution, these checks are not performedwhen the JVM interprets bytecode. Nevertheless,
sincemost Java applications are distributed directly in bytecode form, it is necessary to ensure type safety of the code before
execution. This is done by a dedicated component of the JVM, called bytecode verifier [19]. The bytecode verifier is therefore
one of the key components in the security chain of the Java platform. The verifier checks simple properties of code, such
as well-formedness and absence of stack overflow and underflow. Moreover, it performs a dataflow analysis for ensuring
that all bytecode instructions are applied to operands with proper types. This analysis is an abstract interpretation of the
code, where actual values are substituted by their types and the instructions are interpreted accordingly. At control flow
merge points, the verification algorithm calculates the least common supertypes of the operands coming from the different
execution paths. This operation is only possible when the type hierarchy is a sup semilattice, that is when any two types
always have a least common supertype. Besides primitive types (integer, double, . . . ), Java types are of two kinds: classes
and interfaces. While classes are concrete types, with declaration and definition, interfaces are only groups of constant and
method declarations, without body. Moreover, (multidimensional) arrays of classes, interfaces and basic types are allowed.
Each class is allowed to have only one direct superclass, while it can provide implementation to more than one interface.
Interfaces support the multiple inheritance paradigm.With interfaces, the Java type system is no longer a sup semilattice in
general, thus making the merge operation between types not always feasible [18]. However, least common supertypes al-
ways exist if we restrict to classes. Therefore, standard verification algorithms only consider classes for the type hierarchy. In
this way, the verifier can only detect type errors related to classes, while type checking on interfaces is deferred to run-time.
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The goal of this work is to present a technique that adds type checks for interfaces to bytecode verification with little
implementation effort. The technique exploits themethodology presented in [2],where bytecode verification is decomposed
into multiple specialized sub-analyses, each one checking for errors related to a suitable subset of all types. First, following
a suggestion in [13,22,18], we define an analysis where actual values are abstracted into sets of types instead of single types.
This analysis is able to check for all the type errors already checked by standard verification, plus the errors on interface types.
However, this analysis requires an almost complete re-implementation of existing verifiers, since it requires different data
structures. Instead,wedecompose this set based analysis into several analyses, each one very similar to standard verification.
A first sub-analysis is an enhanced version of the standard verification, only slightly modified so that it can also check for
errors on interface types. The enhanced sub-analysis has the same accuracy of the standard verificationwith respect to class
types. In some cases, however, it can lose precision on interface types, if compared to set based analysis. When precision is
lost (as detected by the analysis itself), a set of additional sub-analyses are executed, each one checking a single interface. All
these sub-analyses can be implemented easily by reusing existing verification algorithms and data structures.We prove that
the above methodology is equivalent to the set based analysis, and thus run-time checks on interface types can be avoided.
Note that this might also improve run-time performance, but probably very slightly: the technique is motivated by quality
of software rather than performance considerations.
The method is fully formalized and proved correct in the abstract interpretation framework [7,9]. Note that the sub-
analyses are obtained in a systematic way that automatically ensures the correctness of the method. We implemented a
proof-carrying code verifier modifying the OpenJDK Hotspot VM. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that
integrates interface type verification with the lightweight verification [23] (de facto standard in the more recent JVMs).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. An overview of the method, together with some intuitive examples,
can be found in Section 2. In Section 3, we model a verifier as a special kind of abstract interpreter and we introduce the
concept of parallel composition of verifiers. Then, in Section 4, we describe the set based verification. We apply abstract
interpretation decomposition to it in Section 5 and show how to obtain a verifier that checks for errors on a single type
(Section 5.2) and the standard verifier (Section 5.3). In Section 6 we use the verifiers defined in Section 5 to build a parallel
verifier that is able to precisely find all errors found by set based verification. In Section 7, we improve the performance
of the verifier defined in Section 6, by removing unnecessary verifiers from the parallel composition. Section 8 describes
the implementation and evaluates its performance with respect to the standard lightweight verification. Related work is
discussed in Section 9. Finally, Section 10 concludes.
2. Overview
For our purposes, a Java program consists of a set C of user defined classes and a set I of user defined interfaces, with
C ∩ I = ∅. Each class defines a set of class fields and methods. Each field has a type, while each method accepts a fixed
number of typed parameters. The set C of classes always contains the predefined class Obj. Classes are related by a user-
defined extC ⊆ C × C relation that must define a tree rooted at Obj. Each interface is a type with method declarations,
without any implementation. To implement an interface, a classmust provide an implementation of all themethods declared
in the interface. While Java does not allow classes to inherit from more than one direct superclass, this is not true for
interfaces. A class can implement more than one interface and an interface can be derived from more than one super-
interface. Thus, the user also defines relations extI ⊆ I× I and impl ⊆ C × I. Relation extI must be acyclic.
For the sake of clarity we present a simplified version of the Java Virtual Machine Language, containing instructions
that do not manipulate basic types, but only class and interface types. Moreover, we assume that all methods take a single
parameter and do not return any value to the caller. The instruction set is presented in Fig. 1. We suppose that an Int class
exists. Execution stops whenever a null reference is found and a non-null reference is required.
Given a class c , we use the syntax c.f : τ to denote field f of class c , of type τ . Each method is denoted by an expression
of the form c.m(τ ), where c is the class or interface which method m belongs to, and τ is the type of the parameter. Each
method is compiled into a (finite) sequence of bytecode instructions. We assume that each instruction is identified by an
address taken from a set L. The result of the compilation of a Java program is a set of class files. A class file is generated by
the Java compiler for each class and interface defined in the program. A class file contains the declaration of the type, and
the JVM Language (JVML) bytecode for each class method. The Java Language allows the programmer to use array types.
Given a type c ∈ C ∪ I, [c represents the type ‘‘array of objects of type c ’’. Multi-dimensional arrays can be used as well.
We will denote with [nc the type of an array of c with dimension n > 0. By convention, type [0c is the same as type c .
The instructions aaload and aastore are used to access the elements of an array. In our simplified language, instructions
aaload and aastore accept instances of class Int, instead of the basic integer type, as indexes for the array elements.
Whenever a class file is loaded by the JVM, it is first examined by the bytecode verifier, whose main purpose is to check
the type correctness of the class. The bytecode verifier performs a data-flow analysis of the code by abstractly executing the
instructions over types instead of over actual values. A Java bytecode verification algorithm is presented in [20]. An overview
can be found in [17]. The verification process is performed method by method: when verifying a method µ = c.m(τ ), the
other methods are assumed to be correct. The verifier uses a context vector, which maps each instruction onto a context.
Given a context vector v, for each instruction address h ∈ L, the context v(h) is made up of a fixed set of Rµ registers and
an operand stack, whose maximum height, Sµ, is also fixed. The context v(h) models the abstract state (containing types
instead of actual values) of the JVM whenever an instruction at address h is about to be executed (before state).
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aload x Pushes a reference from register x to the stack.
astore x Takes a reference from the stack and stores it into register x.
if k (k ∈ L) Takes a reference off from the stack, and jumps to k if the value is equal to null
goto k (k ∈ L) Jumps to k.
getfield c.f : τ (c ∈ C) Takes a non-null object reference of class c from the stack; fetches field f (of type τ )
of the object and loads the field on top of the stack.
putfield c.f : τ (c ∈ C) Takes a value of type τ and a non-null object reference of class c from the stack; saves
the value in the field f of the object.
invoke c.m(τ ) (c ∈ C ∪ I) Takes a value a of type τ and a non-null object reference of class or interface c
from the stack. Invokes method c.m(τ ) of the object with actual parameter a.
aaload Takes a non-null reference to an array of objects and an Int index from the stack. If the array
reference is of type [τ , loads on the stack the value, of type τ , stored at the index position in
the referenced array.
aastore Takes a non-null array reference, anInt index and a value from the stack. The array reference
is of type [τ , the value of type τ . The value is saved in the referenced array at the index
position.
return Terminates the method.
Fig. 1. Instruction set I.
The algorithm uses a lattice of types.1 This lattice contains all the classes in C, an infimum type null representing a null
reference, a supremum type> representing an erroneous type. The order relation in the lattice models the ‘‘assignable to’’
relation in JVML. For example, a subclass is less than its superclass. All user defined classes are assignable to Obj. Using the
lattice of types, contexts and context vectors are pointwise ordered.
When an instruction at address h is abstractly executed by the verifier (in state v(h)), three actions are performed: (i) a
check is made on whether the context contains the expected types for the instruction — for example, if the instruction is
putfield c.f : τ , then the two topmost elements of the stack must contain types assignable to c and τ , respectively; if this
does not occur, the verifier stops and signals an error; (ii) if the check succeeds, the instruction at h is abstractly executed
and thus produces the after state of h — for example, in the case of putfield c.f : τ , the after state is the context obtained
from the before state by popping two elements off the stack; (iii) the after state of h is merged with the state v(k) of each
successor instruction at address k, producing a new state for v(k). Merging is necessary since, due to the conditional and
unconditional jumps, there are instructions at the join of different paths of the control flow graph. The verifier iterates the
above steps until it finds a fixpoint. In the fixpoint, each context element (register or stack item) holds the least common
supertype of the types that the element contains in the different execution paths. Merging two states consists in merging
(by a least upper bound operation on the type domain) the types of each memory register and stack element.
A new trend in bytecode verification is to calculate the fixpoint during the compilation, and then distribute it as an
attribute in the classfile. For each method, the attribute contains the before state of all the targets of branch instructions.
Before execution, the virtual machine must perform a lightweight verification, by checking that the attribute corresponds
to a valid fixpoint. In this way, type inference is delegated to compilation phase, and a simpler type checking process
is performed before execution. The process is efficient because each instruction is abstractly executed only once. Single
successor instructions simply propagate their after state to the instruction that follows them. When arriving at a branch
point, the lightweight verifier checks that the after state is assignable to the state provided by the attribute for all branch
targets. Instructions that are a target of a branch get their before state from the attribute. Note that no merge operation is
performed. This framework is the so-called split verification, and since version 1.6 it is the default verification method for
the Java Hotspot VM. Note that the fixpoint computation performed by the compiler in the split verification framework is
similar to the standard verification illustrated above. Thus, in the following, we will not make any distinction between the
two, unless where explicitly mentioned.
The standard bytecode verification ignores type constraints on interface types. Moreover, when it has to perform amerge
involving interface types it produces Obj as a result, thus losing information. Type checking of interfaces is performed at
run time by the bytecode interpreter. In fact, the standard bytecode verification algorithm requires that the set of types
be at least a sup semilattice, since a least upper bound between two types must always exist. This is no longer true when
considering interfaces, due to multiple inheritance.
Consider for example the snippet of Java code in Fig. 2. Both classes JavaClass and Script implement the two
interfaces Verifiable and Executable. However, classes Script and JavaClass do not have a least common
supertype. The types involved in this example are depicted in Fig. 3 (type names are abbreviated with their initial letter).
This type hierarchy is not a lattice but only a partially ordered set. In fact, the least upper bound between types Script and
JavaClass does not exist. The standard verification algorithm considers only the extC relation, ignoring all interface types.
We introduce an example of a method that we will use to outline the differences between various verification strategies.
Suppose that the JavaClass class contains a method run(Script) whose source code is shown in Fig. 4(a). A compiled
1 The actual algorithm uses a sup semilattice, which can be turned into a lattice by the addition of a bottom element.
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interface Verifiable { void verify(); }
interface Executable { void execute(); }
class JavaClass implements Executable , Verifiable {
public void verify() { /∗ imp l emen t a t i o n ∗ / }
public void execute() { /∗ imp l emen t a t i o n ∗ / }
}
class Script implements Executable , Verifiable {
public void verify() { /∗ imp l emen t a t i o n ∗ / }
public void execute() { /∗ imp l emen t a t i o n ∗ / }
}
Fig. 2. An example of two unrelated classes implementing the same two interfaces.
Fig. 3. An example of a class-interface hierarchy.
void run(Script s) {
Executable e;















Fig. 4. An example of a method of the class JavaClass.
version of the samemethod, using the instruction set defined in Fig. 1, is in Fig. 4(b) (note that theExecutable local variable
is not allocated to a register to keep the example small).
Fig. 5 shows the fixpoint of the context vector in the standard verification algorithm. Stacks are represented with fixed
size (Sµ), whose top is on the left and whose unused elements are equal to>. In this case we have Rµ = 2 and Sµ = 1. The
iteration starts with a context vector v(0) initializedwith all values equal to an infimum type. Each row represents the before
state (in the fixpoint) of the corresponding instruction. To calculate this fixpoint, only onemerge operation is needed. In fact,
the after state of instructions 4 and 5 are merged to obtain the before state of instruction 6. The after state of instruction 4 is
equal to 〈JavaClass Script|Script〉, while the after state of instruction 5 is equal to 〈JavaClass Script|JavaClass〉.
The result of the merge between JavaClass and Script is Obj. Note that instruction 6 expects a class implementing
interface Executable on the top of the stack, but it receives class Objwhich does not. This does not produce a verification
error, since interface types are only checked at run time. However, the method is indeed correct, because both JavaClass
and Script implement interface Executable, thus no run-time check is actually needed. The verifier is unable to prove
its correctness, due to the loss of information in the merge operation.
To check for constraints on interface types at verification time, it is necessary to find a domain in which the merge
operation for interface types can be performed more precisely. This can be achieved if each context item holds the set of
types held during the different execution paths, as suggested in [13,22,18]. In this case the verification must be defined
over the powerset of the verification types, ordered by set containment, which is a complete lattice. The merge operation
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Regs Stack
1:aload 1 Jc Sc >
2:if 5 Jc Sc Sc
3:aload 1 Jc Sc >
4:goto 6 Jc Sc Sc
5:aload 0 Jc Sc >
6:invoke E. . . Jc Sc Obj
7:return Jc Sc >
Fig. 5. Standard verification.
Regs Stack
1:aload 1 {Jc} {Sc} T
2:if 5 {Jc} {Sc} {Sc}
3:aload 1 {Jc} {Sc} T
4:goto 6 {Jc} {Sc} {Sc}
5:aload 0 {Jc} {Sc} T
6:invoke E. . . {Jc} {Sc} {Jc, Sc}
7:return {Jc} {Sc} T
Fig. 6. Set based verification.
Regs Stack
1:aload 1 E E >
2:if 5 E E E
3:aload 1 E E >
4:goto 6 E E E
5:aload 0 E E >
6:invoke E. . . E E E
7:return E E >
Fig. 7. Verification of the Executable interface type.
between contexts is simply the pointwise set union operation on context items, the supremum type is the set T of all types,
and the empty set∅ is the infimum type. This verifier checks that every element in the context item respects the constraints
imposed by the instruction.
Fig. 6 shows the fixpoint of the context vector in this verification strategy for the example in Fig. 4(b). Please note that the
top of the stack at instruction 6 is now the set {JavaClass, Script}, whose elements are all assignable to Executable.
Therefore, the set-based verification is able to detect type errors on interfaces. However, this kind of verification is
significantly different from standard verification. We use the set based verification as the basis for a decomposition in a
series of sub-analyses, one checking class type constraints (and corresponding to the standard verification), and each one of
the others checking the type correctness of a single interface type used in the method. All these analyses use single types,
rather than sets of types, so they are considerably simpler than the set based verification and very similar to the standard
verification. This decomposition, named parallel decomposition, has been introduced in [2]. We show that each sub-analysis
is a complete abstract interpretation of the set-based analysis and that the composition of all sub-analyses has the same
accuracy of the set based analysis.
Consider the method presented in Fig. 4. The set based verification (Fig. 6) can be decomposed into the Standard
Verification (Fig. 5) and into an analysis that checks only for errors related to the Executable interface. In this analysis
each context item may hold only one of the values in {E,>}, where E abstracts a set of types that are all assignable to
Executable, and> abstracts a set of types that contains at least one type not assignable to Executable. The operations
of the verifier have to be interpreted within this domain, leading to the fixpoint depicted in Fig. 7. During this analysis, only
checks related to the Executable interface are performed, ignoring all other constraints, which have to be checked in other
analyses. It is necessary to perform one analysis of this kind for each interface type that is checked inside the method, and
not for all interfaces implemented by the classes used in the method. For instance, in this case, we can avoid to instantiate
an analysis for the interface Verifiable. In fact, even though interface Verifiable is used in the method, there is no
instruction that checks for assignability to it.
However, in many cases creating such interface analysis would be overkill. Consider the code of Fig. 8(a) as an example.
This code is another compiled version of the code of Fig. 4(a), in which the calls to the executemethod have been put in
each of the two branches of the if. Fig. 8(b) shows the fixpoint of the standard verification analysis. We can notice that
the calls to the interface method are now at instruction 4 and 7, where the top of the stack is a JavaClass and a Script
type, respectively. In this example, no loss of information has occurred, thus the standard verifier could certify the invoke
instructions at 4 and 7 as type correct, since both classes JavaClass and Script implement the Executable interface.










1:aload 1 Jc Sc >
2:if 6 Jc Sc Sc
3:aload 1 Jc Sc >
4:invoke E. . . Jc Sc Sc
5:goto 8 Jc Sc >
6:aload 0 Jc Sc >
7:invoke E. . . Jc Sc Jc
8:return Jc Sc >
(a) (b)
Fig. 8. Sometimes, also the standard verifier could perform checks on interfaces.
In this case, there is no need to perform the sub-analysis on the single interfaces used in the method. Note that the verifier
can detect whether precision has been lost. More precisely, precision is lost whenever the calculated upper bound between
two types τ and σ does not implement an interface that both τ and σ implement.
We propose the following methodology for verifying interface types of a method µ of Java bytecode:
1. Perform standard verification, equipped with interface checks and checking for possible loss of precision. If any error on
class types has been found, the verification stops and the method is rejected.
2. Otherwise, if no loss of precision has occurred or no error on interface types has been found, verification stops. The
method is accepted if no errors have been found, and rejected otherwise.
3. Otherwise, for every interface type I that has caused an error in the previous step, perform a verification that only checks
errors related to I. If all verifications succeed, then the methodµ is accepted and the code can be executed without run-
time checks. If any verification fails, the method is rejected.
Note that all the proposed analyses are abstractions of the set based analysis, but their implementation is similar to the
implementation of the standard verification, where single types are used, rather than sets of types.
In order to evaluate the cost of the methodology, we have developed a tool that annotates classfiles with the fixpoint of
the interface sub-analyses (step 2 above) for all methods (even for methods where step 1 does not lose precision), and we
modified the OpenJDK Hotspot VM to read such annotations and perform the lightweight verification. For step 1, we use the
result of the standard verification. This gives an upper bound on the cost of any implementation of the methodology.
2.1. Mathematical notations
Given a set P , ℘(P) denotes the family of its subsets. If Q ⊆ P , then Q is the complement of Q (in P). For any n > 1, Pn
denotes the n-fold Cartesian product of P with itself, P × · · · × P (n times).
A pair 〈P;6〉 is a partially ordered set (poset) if P is a set and 6 is a reflexive, transitive and antisymmetric relation on
P . 〈℘(X);⊆〉 is a poset for any set X . Two elements x, y ∈ P are comparable if either x 6 y, or y 6 x, and incomparable
otherwise. A chain of P is a subset of P in which any two elements are always comparable. If 〈P;6〉 is a poset and Q ⊆ P ,
then ↓Q := { x ∈ P | (∃y ∈ Q ) x 6 y } and, dually, ↑Q := { x ∈ P | (∃y ∈ Q ) y 6 x }. A subset Q ⊆ P is a downset iff
Q = ↓Q , i.e., if y ∈ Q whenever there is x ∈ Q such that y 6 x (an upset is defined dually). Note that the empty set ∅ is
always a downset. If x ∈ P , then ↓x := { y ∈ P | y 6 x } = ↓{ x } (dually for ↑x). A downset Q of the form Q = ↓x for some
x ∈ P is called a principal downset. Note that x 6 y ⇐⇒ ↓x ⊆ ↓y ⇐⇒ ↑x ⊇ ↑y.
If 〈P;6〉 is a poset and Q ⊆ P , then Q u := { x ∈ P | (∀y ∈ Q ) y 6 x } (the upper bounds of Q ) and, dually,
Q ` := { x ∈ P | (∀y ∈ Q ) x 6 y } (the lower bounds of Q ). Note that ∅u = ∅` = P . An element x ∈ Q is minimal if,
whenever y ∈ Q is such that y 6 x, then y = x (dually for maximal). We denote by minQ the set of minimal elements of
Q and by maxQ the set of its maximal elements. Subset Q ⊆ P has a least element if there is x ∈ Q such that x 6 y for all
y ∈ Q . When this is the case, x is the (necessarily unique) least element of Q (dually for greatest element). A subset Q ⊆ P
has a least upper bound (lub) or join, written
∨
Q , if Q u has a least element x, in which case it is x = ∨Q . Dually, Q has a
greatest lower bound (glb) ormeet, written
∧
Q , if Q ` has a greatest element x =∧Q . The join and meet of two elements
x, y ∈ P are also written x ∨ y and x ∧ y, respectively.





Q exist for all subsets Q ⊆ P . Note that∨∅, when it exists, is an element⊥ ∈ P such that⊥ 6 x
for all x ∈ P (the bottom of P), while∧∅ is an element > ∈ P such that x 6 > for all x ∈ P (the top of P). All complete
lattices have both a bottom and a top element. For any set X , 〈℘(X);⊆〉 is a complete lattice where∨ = ⋃ and∧ = ⋂.
If 〈P;6〉 is a (complete) lattice, then, for all n > 1, 〈Pn; 6˙〉 is a (complete) lattice as well. Here, we have defined 6˙ as the
pointwise extension of 6 to Pn (i.e., (x1, . . . x2) 6˙ (y1, . . . , yn) ⇐⇒ (∀1 6 i 6 n) xi 6 yi).
A poset 〈P;6〉 is a tree if: (a) it has a top element; (b) for every x ∈ P , ↑x is a chain.
Given two sets A and B, we denote by A → B the set of functions from A to B. We write f : A → B as equivalent to
f ∈ A → B. Function f is a self-map on A if f : A → A. Given a map f : A → B, and C ⊆ A, the image of C through f is
f (C) := { f (x) | x ∈ C }. Given three sets A, B and C and two functions f : A→ B and g : B→ C , the composition of f and g is
a function g ◦ f : A→ C given by g ◦ f (x) = g(f (x)) for all x ∈ A. Given any function f : A→ B, we denote by f˙ its pointwise
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extension to An → Bn (n > 1), given by f˙ (x1, . . . , xn) = (f (x1), . . . , f (xn)). For any set A, we denote by idA : A → A the
identity function on A (we will omit the subscript when no confusion may arise).
If 〈P;6P〉 and 〈Q ;6Q 〉 are two posets, a function f : P → Q is monotone if f (x) 6Q f (y) whenever x 6P y. It is an
order-embedding if x 6P y ⇐⇒ f (x) 6Q f (y) for all x, y ∈ P . An order-embedding which is also surjective is an
isomorphism. Isomorphic posets (i.e., posets between which an isomorphism exists) are indistinguishable from the point
of view of their ordering related properties. A weaker property than isomorphism is the concept of Galois connection.
Two functions f : P → Q and g : Q → P form a Galois Connection (P, f , g,Q ) between posets 〈P;6P〉 and 〈Q ;6Q 〉 if
f (x) 6Q y ⇐⇒ x 6P g(y) for all x ∈ P and y ∈ Q . Function f is called the lower adjoint and function g is the upper adjoint.
Lower adjoints preserve all existing joins; i.e., whenever
∨
A exists in P , then
∨
f (A) exists in Q and f (
∨
A) = ∨ f (A),
dually for upper adjoints.
If P and Q are two complete lattices and f : P → Q is such that f (∨ C) = ∨ f (C) for all chains C ⊆ P , then f is said
to be continuous. All continuous functions are monotone. If f : P → P is a self-map on a set P , any element x ∈ P such that
x = f (x) is called a fixpoint of f . If 〈P;6〉 is a complete lattice, the set of all fixpoints of a monotone self-map f on P forms a
complete lattice, thus it has a least element, called the least fixpoint of f and denoted lfp f . For any self-map f : P → P we
can define the Kleene iteration {f n(⊥)}n>0, where f 0 = idP , f n+1 = f ◦ f n and⊥ is the bottom of P .
We denote by lki f := ∨n>0 f n(⊥) the limit of the Kleene iteration of f (this limit always exists when P is a complete
lattice). If f is continuous, then lki f = lfp f . Dual considerations can be made for the greatest fixpoint gfp f .
A monotone self-map ρ on a poset 〈P;6〉 is an (upper) closure operator on P if it is extensive (i.e., x 6 ρ(x) for all x ∈ P)
and idempotent (i.e., ρ ◦ ρ = ρ). The set of fixpoints of a closure operator ρ : P → P is given by ρ(P). If P is a complete
lattice, then ρ(P) is a Moore family of P , i.e., a subset of P which is closed under arbitrary meets (note that Moore families
are complete lattices themselves). Conversely, ifM ⊆ P is any Moore family of the complete lattice P , then
ρM = λx.
∧
{ y ∈ M | x 6 y } (1)
is a closure operator on P such that ρM(P) = M . The correspondence between the closure operators on a complete lattice
and its Moore families is 1–1. For any complete lattice 〈P;6〉 and Q ⊆ P , define
M (Q ) :=
{∧
A | A ⊆ Q
}
. (2)




If (A, f , g, B) is a Galois connection between posets A and B, then g ◦ f is a closure operator on A. If f ◦ g = idB, then
(A, f , g, B) is also called a Galois Insertion (of B into A). When this is the case, B is isomorphic to g ◦ f (A), with g being the
isomorphism. Conversely, if ρ is a closure operator on A and f : ρ(A) → B is an isomorphism, then (A, f ◦ ρ, f −1, B) is a
Galois Insertion.
2.2. Abstract interpretation
Abstract interpretation [7] is a framework that allows an approximate evaluation of the semantics of a discrete dynamic
system. The semantics is modeled as a pair (C, f ) of a complete lattice 〈C;6C 〉, called the concrete domain, and a semantic
function f , where f maps each element of the system (e.g., each program of a programming language) to an element in C .
Typically, f is defined in terms of a (least) fixpoint of some other lower level function. Abstraction is introduced by defining
a new complete lattice 〈A;6A〉, called the abstract domain, and introducing an abstract semantic function f ] that mimics
the concrete one, f , in the abstract domain. The relationship between the concrete and abstract domain is generally defined
by means of a Galois Insertion (C, α, γ , A), where α is the abstraction function and γ the concretization function. Abstract
semantic function f ] is generally required to be sound, i.e.,
α(f (p)) 6A f ](p) ⇐⇒ f (p) 6C γ (f ](p)),
where p is, for example, the programwe are analyzing. The above expressions contain inequalities rather then equalities, to
account for the fact that f ] may lose precision wrt α ◦ f . If α(f (p)) = f ](p), then f ] is said to be complete.
The choice of the abstract domain A (modulo its isomorphic representations) determines most of the properties of the
abstraction, including the best available (i.e., the most precise, while retaining soundness) abstract interpretation f ] of
semantic function f , and the availability of a complete abstract interpretation for f . Thanks to themathematical relationships
briefly outlined in the previous section, an abstraction of C can also be defined either by a closure operator on C , or by aMoore
family of C . In these two (equivalent) approaches, the abstract domain is a subset of C (the set of fixpoints of the chosen
closure operator, which is a Moore family of C , or the chosen Moore family of C , which determines a corresponding closure
operator on C). If the abstraction is defined by a closure operator ρ on C , then the abstract domain is A := ρ(C), the best
interpretation of f is f b := ρ ◦ f , and a complete interpretation of f exists iff f b is complete [12]. If, instead, the abstraction
is defined by a Moore familyM of C , then the abstract domain is A := M , while f b = ρM ◦ f , where ρM is defined in (1). We
say that M is complete for f when f b is complete for f . The notion of completeness naturally extends to sets of functions:
given a set of functions F , we say that a Moore familyM is complete for F if and only ifM is complete for every f ∈ F .
The set of all upper closure operators on a complete lattice 〈C;6C 〉, denoted by uco(C), is also a complete lattice,
when closure operators are ordered pointwise. Set uco(C) can be understood as the set of all abstractions of C (modulo
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isomorphism). Themeet operation∧ in uco(C) is simply the pointwise extension of themeet operation in C and corresponds
to the well known reduced product of abstractions [8]. If we move from closure operators to the corresponding Moore
families, we can consider the set of all Moore families of C , ordered by⊇, which is isomorphic to uco(C) and so is a complete
lattice as well. The meet operation in this lattice is given by Moore closure of set union:
M1 ∧M2 := M (M1 ∪M2) (3)
for all Moore familiesM1 andM2 of C .
Recalling the work on domain refinement by Giacobazzi et al. [12], we define two operators on the set of all Moore
families of a complete lattice. If 〈D;6D〉 and 〈C;6C 〉 are two complete lattices, F ⊆ D→ C is a set of continuous functions,
and Q is a Moore family of C , then





max{ d ∈ D | f (d) 6C q }
)
. (4)
Note thatRF (Q ) is a Moore family of D. More precisely, it is the ‘‘greatest’’ (in the ordering given by⊇, thus it is the smallest
in the inclusion ordering) Moore family of D which is complete wrt all functions in F . If ρ and η are the closure operators
corresponding to RF (Q ) and Q , respectively, we have
η ◦ f = f b ◦ ρ (= η ◦ f ◦ ρ)
for all f ∈ F .
If 〈D;6〉 is a complete lattice, F is a set of continuous self maps on D and Q is a Moore family of D, we denote by SF (Q )
the absolute complete shell, that is the least precise Moore family of D which extends Q and is complete for all functions in
F . If ρ is the closure operator corresponding toSF (Q ), we have
ρ ◦ f = f b ◦ ρ
for all f ∈ F . The absolute complete shell of Q minimally extends Q , by adding only those elements of Dwhich are required
to achieve completeness wrt F . The absolute complete shell can be computed as
SF (Q ) = gfpλA.Q ∧ RF (A). (5)
We will use the complete shell operator S to derive in a constructive way the simplest abstract domains that make the
sub-analyses complete.
3. Verifiers as abstract interpreters
In this section we model a verifier as a special kind of abstract interpreter and we define some relations of abstraction
between verifiers. Finally, we introduce the concept of parallel composition of verifiers.
Definition 1 (Verifier). A verifier is a quadruple 〈A, B, f , g〉, where A and B are complete lattices, f : A→ A, g : A→ B and g
is monotone. The result of a verifier V := 〈A, B, f , g〉 is
res(V ) := g(lki f ). 
Domain A should be intended as the domain of context vectors, B as the domain of results. As usual, the orderings in A and B
model the ‘‘is more precise than’’ relation. The semantic function is split into two distinct functions: f only performs a step of
the data flow analysis, without checking for errors, while g only computes the errors contained in a context vector. Note that
we do not require f to be monotone in general, in order to encompass the verifier defined in Section 7.1. If V = 〈A, B, f , g〉
is a verifier with a monotone f , we say that V is a monotone verifier. In the typical case f is not only monotone, but also
continuous, and then we have res(V ) = g(lfp f ).
We now define some relations between different verifiers.
Definition 2 (Abstraction). VerifierV2 = 〈A2, B2, f2, g2〉 is a (sound) abstraction of verifierV1 = 〈A1, B1, f1, g1〉 iff there exists
an upper closure operator η on 〈B1;6B〉 such that:
(i) B2 = η(B1) and
(ii) η(res(V1)) 6B res(V2).
If V2 is an abstraction of V1 and η is the required closure operator, we write V1 6η V2 and say that V2 is an abstraction of V1
through η. 
Note that point (i) in Definition 2 requires B2 ⊆ B1, since η : B2 → B2 would not be well defined otherwise. A verifier V2 is
an abstraction of another verifier V1 if its result is sound wrt the result of V1, yet it may be less precise.
Definition 3 (Single-step Abstraction). Let V1 = 〈A1, B1, f1, g1〉 and V2 = 〈A2, B2, f2, g2〉 be two monotone verifiers. We say
that V2 is a single-step (sound) abstraction of V1 iff there exist upper closure operators η on 〈B1;6B〉 and ρ on 〈A1;6A〉 such
that:
(i) A2 = ρ(A1),
(ii) B2 = η(B1),
(iii) ρ ◦ f1 6A f2 ◦ ρ and
(iv) η ◦ g1 6B g2 ◦ ρ.
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If V2 is a single-step abstraction of V1 with η and ρ as the required closure operators, we write V1 6ρ,η V2 and say that V2 is
a single-step abstraction of V1 through ρ and η. 
While Definition 2 is concerned only with the final result of the verification, Definition 3 requires that each step of the data
flow analysis of verifier V2 is a sound approximation of the corresponding step of verifier V1.
Note that, as an immediate consequence of awell known result of abstract interpretation theory,wehaveV1 6ρ,η V2 =⇒
V1 6η V2. In fact, it is well known that point 3(iii), together with the monotonicity of f1 and f2, implies ρ(lki f1) 6A lki f2 and
then, by Definition 3(iv) and monotonicity of g2, we get
η(res(V1)) = η(g1(lki f1)) 6B g2(ρ(lki f1)) 6B g2(lki f2) = res(V2).
We also define complete abstraction and complete single-step abstraction as the stronger counterparts of Definitions 2 and
3, respectively. More precisely, we write V1 Pη V2 and say that V2 is a complete abstraction of V1 (through η) iff the same
conditions for V1 6η V2 hold, but relation 2(ii) is an equality. Similarly, we write V1 Pρ,η V2 and say that V2 is a complete
single-step abstraction of V1 (through ρ and η) iff the same conditions for V1 6ρ,η V2 hold, but both relations 3(iii) and (iv)
are equalities. Note that V1 Pρ,η V2 =⇒ V1 Pη V2.
We say that verifier V1 is equivalent to verifier V2, and write V1 ≡ V2, iff V1 Pid V2. Two equivalent verifiers produce
the same result, possibly in two different ways. Note that ≡ is indeed an equivalence relation. Moreover, if V Pη V1 and
V Pη V2, then V1 ≡ V2.
For the rest of the section, we will restrict ourselves to verifiers whose domain of results is a Moore family of a fixed
domain Bˆ. Note that 6∗:= ⋃η∈uco(Bˆ) 6η and P∗:= ⋃η∈uco(Bˆ) Pη are pre-orders. We can turn these pre-orders into partial
orders if we identify verifiers related by≡.
We now introduce parallel composition as a binary operation on verifiers. Given two verifiers V1 and V2, their parallel
composition is a verifier that performs both data flow analyses of V1 and V2 in parallel, and then computes the meet of the
two results.
Definition 4 (Parallel Composition). If V1 = 〈A1, B2, f1, g1〉 and V2 = 〈A2, B2, f2, g2〉 are two verifiers, their parallel
composition is a new verifier defined as
V1 ‖ V2 := 〈A1 × A2, B1 ∧ B2, f1 × f2, g1 ∧ g2〉,
where (f1 × f2)(x, y) = (f1(x), f2(y)) and (g1 ∧ g2)(x, y) = g1(x) ∧ g2(y) for all x ∈ A1 and y ∈ A2. 








The following proposition is a slight generalization of the result in [2]. It shows how a verifier can be split into a set of
verifiers, whose composition is the original verifier.
Proposition 5 (Parallel Decomposition). Let V = 〈A, B, f , g〉 and take {Vi}i∈I , where Vi = 〈Ai, Bi, fi, gi〉 for i ∈ I . If V Pηi Vi for
all i ∈ I , then V Pη fi∈I Vi, where η =∧i∈I ηi. In particular, if η = id, then fi∈I Vi ≡ V .
If we consider the family of all complete abstractions of a verifier V , with equivalent verifiers identified and then ordered
by P∗, we have that parallel composition is equivalent to meet.
4. Set based verification
In the following, given a method µ, we describe a verifier SetVµ based on sets of types. The idea is to model the state
of each register and stack element e of the JVM, at each instruction i, as the set of all types that may appear in e whenever
instruction i is about to be executed. This verifier can be implemented in a JVM and it overcomes the problemwith interface
types. However, we want to show that the same information produced by SetVµ can be obtained by a set of much simpler
verifiers, one of which closely corresponds to the standard verifier. Thus, we take SetVµ only as concrete verifier, which we
then abstract in several ways, and as a reference, since we want to compare the result of our abstractions with the result
obtained by SetVµ.
Verifier SetV (omitting the µ subscript for simplicity) is defined as
SetV := 〈V,E, next, error〉. (7)
SetV (defined in Section 4.2) is a complete latticewhose elementsmodel the state of the verification. Function next : V→ V
(defined in Section 4.3) models one step of the verification and function error : V→ E (defined in Section 4.4) models type
checking actions. Finally, the complete lattice E := 〈℘(T);⊆〉 is the domain of type errors. Set T (defined in Section 4.1) is
the set of verification types (which include the Java language types together with some additional types needed during the
verification), ordered by an assignable-to relation (Section 4.1). The idea is tomodel a type error on type τ (i.e., an instruction
requiring type τ may be executed on a value of a type not assignable-to τ ) with τ itself. A method may contain zero, one or
more of such type errors, so we use the sets of elements of T as the domain of type errors.











τ v Obj if τ 6= >
Fig. 9. Thev relation.
4.1. Types
Set T is defined as
T := {null,>} ∪ { [nc | c ∈ C ∪ I, n > 0 }. (8)
Type nullmodels the type of a null reference in Java, which is assignable to a reference of any class or interface type. Type
>, instead, models an error type, which cannot be assigned to any other type.
We build the assignable-to relationv∗⊆ T×T as the reflexive transitive closure of relationv⊆ T×T defined inductively
by the rules in Fig. 9. The set 〈T;v∗〉 is (by definition) a poset, but it may not be a lattice in general, due to the generality
of relations extI and impl, which are inherited by relation v∗ through rule ext. Note that null is the bottom of T (by rule
null), sincewe are considering a subset of Java types containing only classes, interfaces and their (multidimensional) arrays.
The error type> is placed at the top of T by rule top, since this arrangement simplifies the abstraction in Section 5.3. Rule
obj states that all non error types, including arrays, are assignable to type Obj. Finally, rule arr states that an array type is
assignable to another array type if the elements of the former are assignable to the elements of the latter. If τ ∈ T has the
form [nc for some n > 0 and c ∈ C ∪ I, then the symbol [iτ , with i > 0, is well-defined and denotes type [n+ic (i is omitted
when i = 1). Otherwise, symbol [iτ is ill-defined. In rule arr, we have left implicit the condition that both [τ and [σ must
be well-defined.
From the rules of Fig. 9 and the definition of reflexive transitive closure of a relation we can compute ↓τ for each τ ∈ T,
thus giving a characterization of all types assignable to a given type τ . This is useful in computing with types.
Proposition 6. Take c ∈ C ∪ I with c 6= Obj and n > 0. Then
(i) ↓> = T,
(ii) ↓[nc = { [nb | b v∗ c } ∪ {null},
(iii) ↓[nObj = { [mb | m > n } ∪ {null},
(iv) ↓null = {null}. 
4.2. Contexts and context vector
Let I be the set of bytecode instructions defined in Fig. 1, and Lµ = [0, Lµ] the set of instruction addresses of method µ,
where Lµ is the number of instructions of themethod.Weuse Bµ : Lµ → I tomap eachmethod address to the corresponding
bytecode instruction.We assume that Bµ(0) is the entry point ofmethodµ. At label 0we place a special instructionstart µ,
whose executionmodels the initialization of the JVM registers and stack at the beginning of the execution of amethod. Label
Lµ + 1 is used to model termination of the method.
The SetVµ verifier models the state of the JVM using registers and stacks that contain sets of types taken from T. For a
methodµwith amaximumnumber of registers Rµ and amaximum stack size Sµ we represent each context with aNµ-tuple
of subsets of T, with Nµ = Rµ + Sµ. Therefore a context C belongs to the set ℘(T)Nµ . We denote with Ci the i-th element
of the context C . We have that Ci represents a register if 0 6 i < Rµ and a stack item if Rµ 6 i < Nµ. We will omit the
µ subscript from now on. Note that in any given context C , the actual size of the stack may be less than its maximum S.
In our representation, CR always denotes the top of the stack. This is a notational convenience that removes the need to
record and update a stack pointer variable. If the actual stack height is k, then the stack items are CR, . . . , CR+k−1, while the
elements CR+k . . . CN−1 are bound to T. The set T is the maximum element of the lattice℘(T) and therefore models absence
of information. Bytecode verifiers usually check also some properties concerning stack size. In particular, they check that
stack overflow/underflow never occur and that in all the execution paths at each instruction the height of the stack is always
the same. We omit these checks from our discussion for simplicity, and assume that these conditions are always met.
A context vector contains a distinct context for each instruction of the method. The idea is that the context associated
with instruction at address hmodels the state of the JVM whenever instruction at address h is about to be executed (before
state). A context vector v is an element of V = ℘(T)T , where T = N(L + 1). In a context vector v, the before context of
instruction at address 0 6 h 6 L is stored in elements vhN , . . . , v(h+1)N−1. The partial order⊆ on℘(T) is extended pointwise
to V as ⊆˙, turning 〈V; ⊆˙〉 into a complete lattice.
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nextJstart c.m(τ )KC = 〈{c}, {τ },T, . . . ,T|T, . . . ,T〉
nextJaload xKC = 〈C0, . . . , CR−1|Cx, CR, . . . , CN−2〉
nextJastore xKC = 〈C0, . . . , Cx−1, CR, Cx+1, . . . , CR−1|CR+1, . . . , CN−1,T〉
nextJif kKC = 〈C0, . . . , CR−1|CR+1, . . . , CN−1,T〉
nextJgoto kKC = C
nextJgetfield c.f : τ KC = 〈C0, . . . , CR−1|{τ }, CR+1, . . . , CN−1〉
nextJputfield c.f : τ KC = 〈C0, . . . , CR−1|CR+2, . . . , CN−1,T,T〉
nextJreturnKC = C
nextJaaloadKC = 〈C0, . . . , CR−1|[−1(CR), CR+2, . . . , CN−1,T〉
nextJaastoreKC = 〈C0, . . . , CR−1|CR+3, . . . , CN−1,T,T,T〉
nextJinvoke c.m(τ )KC = 〈C0, . . . , CR−1|CR+2, . . . , CN−1,T,T〉
Fig. 10. Function nextJIK for I ∈ I ∪ {start c.m(τ )}.
4.3. Dataflow analysis
In this section we define function next : V → V, that models the abstract execution of the method we are verifying,
without checking for possible type errors. Abstraction of a complex object is greatly simplified if we can decompose the
complex object into simpler components, find abstract counterparts for these components, and then build the abstraction
of the original object from them. Function next is such a complex object, sowe showhow to build it startingwith very simple
components, namely a set of one argument functions in ℘(T)→ ℘(T).
First, we give an interpretation of the instructions in I. An instruction is interpreted as a function that takes a context
(before context) and outputs another context (after context), modelling the effect of the instruction (wrt types in registers
and stack elements) in all possible executions. Thus,we introduce a semantic function nextJ•K : I→ (℘(T)N → ℘(T)N).We
denote a context C with the N-tuple 〈C0, . . . , CR−1|CR, . . . , CN−1〉, where the elements before the | symbol are the registers
and the remaining elements are the stack items. Function nextJ•K can then be defined as in Fig. 10. For instance, since after
the application of an if k instruction a stack element is consumed, all the stack items (except for the top element) are shifted
one position leftward and the last element of the stack takes the value T. Function [−1 : T→ T, used in the semantics of the
aaload instruction, is defined as
[−1(τ ) =

τ ′ if τ = [τ ′,
null if τ = null,
> otherwise.
(9)
Function [−1 : T → T is lifted to a function in ℘(T) → ℘(T) in the usual way: if f : A → B and X ⊆ A, then
f (X) = { f (x) | x ∈ X }. A type-safe bytecode applies the aaload instruction to an array of objects to access an element of
the array. Therefore, its effects at the type level is to transform the array type [τ into the type τ . However, since we cannot
assume that, during verification, we always have an array type on the top of the stack, we have to define the behavior of the
aaload also when it is applied to non-array types.
Function nextJ•K can be built from a set of functions in ℘(T) → ℘(T), namely: the identity function id on ℘(T); for
each τ ∈ T, a constant function returning always {τ }; a constant function∅ returning∅; a constant function T returning T;
function [−1. We call these functions the base functions of I. For each instruction I , function nextJIK can be built by arranging
some of these base functions in a N×N matrix. Each row i of the matrix contains N functions, where the function in column
j produces the types that can be stored in position i of the after context, depending on the contents of position j in the before
context, when instruction I is executed.
For example, assume that R (the number of registers) is 2 and S (the maximum stack size) is 3. Then, function
nextJaload 1K can be written as
nextJaload 1K =

id ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅
∅ id ∅ ∅ ∅
∅ id ∅ ∅ ∅
∅ ∅ id ∅ ∅
∅ ∅ ∅ id ∅
 .









nextJaload 1K2j(Cj) = ∅(C0) ∪ id(C1) ∪ ∅(C2) ∪ ∅(C3) ∪ ∅(C4) = C1,
i.e., the stack top in the after context is equal to the content of register 1 in the before context.
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errorJstart c.m(τ )K = (∅, . . . ,∅|∅, . . . ,∅)
errorJaload xK = (∅, . . . ,∅︸ ︷︷ ︸
x−1
, chkObj,∅, . . . ,∅|∅, . . . ,∅)
errorJastore xK = (∅, . . . ,∅|chkObj,∅, . . . ,∅)
errorJif kK = (∅, . . . ,∅|chkObj,∅, . . . ,∅)
errorJgoto kK = (∅, . . . ,∅|∅, . . . ,∅)
errorJgetfield c.f : τ K = (∅, . . . ,∅|chkc,∅, . . . ,∅)
errorJputfield c.f : τ K = (∅, . . . ,∅|chkτ , chkc,∅, . . . ,∅)
errorJreturnK = (∅, . . . ,∅|∅, . . . ,∅)
errorJaaloadK = (∅, . . . ,∅|chkInt, chk[Obj,∅, . . . ,∅)
errorJaastoreK = (∅, . . . ,∅|chk[Obj, chkInt, chkObj,∅, . . . ,∅)
errorJinvoke c.m(τ )K = (∅, . . . ,∅|chkτ , chkc,∅, . . . ,∅)
Fig. 11. The function errorJIK (the type-checking of the instruction I).
Given a method µ = c.m(τ ), with bytecode instructions B, the control flow graph of µ can be represented by means of
a relation;⊆ L × L defined as follows: for all h ∈ [0, Lµ], h ; h + 1 if B(h) 6= goto k and B(h) 6= return; h ; k if
B(h) = if k or B(h) = goto k, h ; Lµ + 1 if B(h) = return.
We define function next : V→ V as a block matrix composed of (L+ 1)× (L+ 1) blocks, where each block is an N × N
matrix. Thus,
next :=
M00 · · · M0L... ...
ML0 · · · MLL
 ,
whereMkh = nextJB(h)K if h ; k, and it is a matrix of constant∅ functions otherwise. Matrix next is a T × T matrix, where
T = N(L + 1) is the size of the context vector. Given v ∈ V, modelling the state of the verifier at a given point in the





The least fixpoint iteration of the dataflow analysis can thus be obtained with a Kleene iteration starting from ⊥V :=






Type checking actions of the instructions in I are modelled by a function errorJ•K : I→ (℘(T)N → ℘(T)) that, given the
before context C at a given instruction, returns the set of type constraints that C does not respect when abstractly executing
the instruction. Each type constraint violation is represented by a type in T. The definition of errorJ•K can be found in Fig. 11.
Each errorJIK function is a N × 1 row-vector of elementary functions in ℘(T) → ℘(T). Only two kinds of elementary
functions are needed: the constant function returning ∅ and function chkτ : ℘(T)→ ℘(T), with τ ∈ T, defined as
chkτ (A) =
{
∅ if A ⊆ ↓τ ,
{τ } otherwise, (12)
that checks that the set A contains only types that are assignable to τ . Finally, we define error : V→ E as as a T × 1 block
matrix






5. Abstractions of SetV
Given some abstractionE] = η(E) of the domain of errors, we are interested in a verifier SetV] := 〈V],E], next], error]〉,
such thatSetV Pη SetV]. The task of defining this abstraction can be accomplished in three steps using complete shell theory:
(i) find an abstraction V of Vwhich is at least as precise as Rerror(E]);
(ii) find an abstraction V] of Vwhich is at least as precise asSnext(V);
(iii) let error] := η ◦ error and next] := ρ ◦ next, where ρ is the closure operator corresponding to V].
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Step (i) ensures completeness wrt error and step (ii) ensures completeness wrt next, while preserving completeness wrt
error. Then, step (iii) defines next] and error] as the best abstractions of next and error wrt E] and V] as found in step (ii),
thus both next] and error] are complete as required. More precisely, steps (i)–(iii) above ensure that SetV Pρ,η SetV], and
thus also SetV Pη SetV].
Steps (i)–(iii) are greatly simplified by our definition of V, next and error given in Sections 4.2–4.4, respectively. In fact,
we can find abstractions of ℘(T) and lift them to abstractions of V by simple pointwise extension. More importantly, the
abstractions of ℘(T) can be found using complete shell theory wrt the simple functions in ℘(T) → ℘(T) used in the
definitions of next and error. This is possible because both next and error have been defined as unions of the results of
these simple functions, and any closure operator is complete wrt to join (which is set union in 〈℘(T);⊆〉) and function
composition. Thus, we can replace steps (i) and (ii) above with the following, much simpler steps:
(i)′ find an abstraction T of ℘(T) which is at least as precise as RG(E]), where G is the set of all chkτ functions and
function ∅;
(ii)′ find an abstraction ℘(T)] of ℘(T) which is at least as precise as SF (T ), where F is the set of all base functions in I,
then let V] be the pointwise extension to vectors of ℘(T)];
Step (iii) remains the same, noting that ρ will be the pointwise extension to vectors of the closure operator corresponding to
℘(T)]. Note that all functions in G and F , as defined above, are easily seen to be continuous, so that bothRG(E]) andSF (T )
are well defined.
The computation of SF (T ) in step (ii)′ can be further simplified by noting that SF is an upper adjoint in a Galois









for any family {Mi}i∈I of Moore families of ℘(T). Recall that least upper bound in L corresponds to Moore closure of set
union, as shown in (3). This implies that, if T can be decomposed into {Mi}i∈I , then we can obtainSF (T ) from the family of
SF (Mi), for i ∈ I .
5.1. Subset-of-errors abstraction
Let us suppose thatwewant to check for absence of errors on a subset E of types only. This can bemodelled by abstracting
the set of errorsEwith the Galois Insertion (E, αE, γE, ℘(E)) given by αE(Q ) = Q ∩E and γE(Q ) = Q ∪E. The corresponding
closure operator ηE : E→ E is
ηE(Q ) = Q ∪ E (15)
and the corresponding abstract domain (Moore family of E) is E] := ηE(E) = { X | X ⊆ E }.
Intuitively, it should be possible to perform a simplified verification, in which we abstract away from the typing
information that is not needed to assess absence of errors in E. Our goal is to define a sound and complete abstract
interpretation; i.e., we should signal an error in E if and only if this error is signaled by SetV. More precisely, we define
an operator SubV from E = ℘(T) to the family of all verifiers. Given a subset E of types, E ⊆ T, we define
SubV(E) := 〈V],E], next], error]〉
such that SetV PηE SubV(E). In the rest of this subsection we show how to compute V] in terms of E, by following the
procedure outlined above in this section.
In the following proposition, we give a characterization of T , given E, where T is the domain defined in step (i)′ above.
Proposition 7. Take E ⊆ T and let ηE = λQ .Q ∪ E and G = { chkτ | τ ∈ T } ∪ {∅}. Then
RG(ηE(E)) = M ({ ↓τ | τ ∈ E }). 
Thus, to check for absence of errors in E we do not need the whole of ℘(T), but only those subsets which are intersections
of principal downsets with top in E. Note that the intersection of two principal downsets may not be a principal downset.
For instance, referring back to Fig. 3, we have that ↓Verifiable ∩ ↓Executable = ↓{Script, JavaClass}, which is
not a principal downset since it has two maximal elements.
Observation 8. If we take E = T in Proposition 7, we obtain the result that errors can be checked usingM ({ ↓τ | τ ∈ T })
instead of the whole of ℘(T). This is the Dedekind–MacNeille completion [10] DM(T) of 〈T;v∗〉, where, for any poset
〈P;6〉, DM(P) := { A ⊆ P | Au` = A }. In fact, for any x ∈ P , (↓x)u` = ↓x and moreover DM(P) is closed under arbitrary
intersections, thusM ({ ↓x | x ∈ P }) ⊆ DM(P). On the other hand, the set { ↓x | x ∈ P } is meet-dense in DM(P), i.e., every
element of DM(P) is the intersection of a subset of { ↓x | x ∈ P }, thus DM(P) ⊆ M ({ ↓x | x ∈ P }). 
In order to perform step (ii)′ above, we use the characterization of T given by Proposition 7 and note that we can also
write T = M (⋃τ∈T {↓τ ,T}). Thus, by (14), we can obtain SF (T ) by finding the absolute complete shells for domains of
the form {↓τ ,T}, for all τ ∈ T, wrt all base functions in I.We give a characterization of these complete shells in the following
proposition (see Appendix for the proof).
N. De Francesco et al. / Theoretical Computer Science 411 (2010) 2174–2201 2187
Proposition 9. Let c ∈ C ∪ I, n > 0 and F ⊆ ℘(T)→ ℘(T) be the set of base functions of I. Then,
(i) SF ({↓>}) = {↓>},
(ii) SF ({↓null,T}) = {↓null,T},
(iii) SF ({↓[nc,T}) = {↓[n+ic | i > 0 } ∪ {T,↓null}. 
Using Proposition 9 and (14) we can compute the requested abstraction ℘(T)] by





Observation 10. If F is defined as in Proposition 9, we have thatSF (DM(T)) = DM(T). In fact, DM(T) = M ({ ↓τ | τ ∈ T })
by Observation 8. Note that { ↓τ | τ ∈ T } =⋃τ∈T{↓τ ,T} since ↓> = T, thus we can compute






Proposition 9 shows that, for each τ ∈ T, SF ({↓τ ,T}) is a set of principal downset of T. Since every principal downset of
T is in DM(T), we have that SF ({↓τ ,T}) ⊆ DM(T) for all τ ∈ T, and this implies that⋃τ∈T SF ({↓τ ,T}) ⊆ DM(T). In
turn, this implies that SF (DM(T)) ⊆ DM(T) by monotonicity ofM and the fact that DM(T) is a Moore family. The reverse
inclusion, DM(T) ⊆ SF (DM(T)), is given, since SF is an upper closure operator. Together with Observation 8, this Obs.
shows that SetV can be equivalently redefined by replacing ℘(T)with the (generally smaller) DM(T) in the definition of V.
This is essentially the same result as in [16]. 
We conclude the subsection by relating subset of errors abstractions to Parallel Decomposition.








In particular, if {Ei}i∈I covers T, then fi∈I SubV(Ei) ≡ SetV. 
Thus, if we have a set of verifiers, each one checking a different subset of errors, then their composition is equivalent to
a single verifier that checks the union of those subsets. In particular, the SetV verification can be performed by a parallel
composition of verifiers corresponding to a partition of the set of all errors.
5.2. Single type verification
As a first example of the subset of errors abstraction, we compute SubV({c}) for any fixed c ∈ C ∪ I. We will use this
abstraction in Section 6. This corresponds to looking for absence of type errors on class (or interface) c only, ignoring all
other possible type errors.
Let ηc : E→ E given by ηc(Q ) = Q ∪ {c} be the closure operator on E defined as in (15). To complete step (i)′, we have
to compute RG(ηc(E)), where G is defined as in Proposition 7. According to the same Proposition, we have
RG(ηc(E)) = M ({↓c}) = {↓c,T },
where T is added by the Moore operator, since T = ∧∅. The two elements of RG(ηc(E)) represent all types assignable
to c and all types not assignable to c , respectively. The result for step (ii)′ is given by (9(iii)), with n = 0. Thus, we get an
abstraction of ℘(T) given by ℘(T)] = {↓[nc | n > 0 } ∪ {T,↓null}. The corresponding closure operator is
ρc(X) =

↓[nc if X ⊆ ↓[nc ,
↓null if X ⊆ ↓null
T otherwise.
(17)
Its pointwise extension toV gives theV] abstractionwewere looking for. Note that℘(T)] only contains principal downsets,
thus it can be implemented using the isomorphic domain
C := { [nc | n > 0 } ∪ {>, null },
which does not require the implementation of sets of types. In the implementation, type null is preserved, while types
[nd are abstracted into [nc if d v∗ c , and into > otherwise. Errors on c are checked, while other errors are ignored. Note
the need to preserve information on the arrays of c (or of types assignable to c). This is due to the presence of function
[−1 in the set of base functions of I. This function may produce a type assignable to c from a type not assignable to c . For
instance, [−1([c) = c , but [c 6v∗ c. If we want to be precise in proving that no errors on type c are present, we must not
lose information on types assignable to c and, because of [−1, we are forced to preserve enough information for all those
other types that may produce a type assignable to c through [−1. Note that, once we have found that we are forced to use
domain C above, we can choose to check for errors on all [nc (n > 1) types as well, since we have all the information to do
so precisely. This corresponds to switching from SubV({c}) to SubV({ [nc | n > 0 }).
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5.3. Standard verification
Wemodel Standard Verification (StdV) as a subset-of-errors abstraction of the SetV verifier defined in Section 4. In fact,
StdV does not check for absence of errors on interfaces types, and this behavior can be modelled by defining StdV :=
SubV(Ts), where Ts ⊆ T is defined as
Ts = {>, null} ∪ { [nc | c ∈ C, n > 0 }.
Let us define ηs as in (15), i.e., ηs(Q ) = Q ∪ Ts. According to Proposition 7, we can choose T (step (i)′ above) as
T := M ({ ↓τ | τ ∈ Ts }). The following proposition is mainly a consequence of the fact that 〈C; ext∗C〉 is a tree, and it
allows us to drop the Moore operator in the definition of T .
Proposition 12. { ↓τ | τ ∈ Ts } is a Moore family of ℘(T). 
The following proposition, instead, shows that T is already complete for all base functions in language I, so that we have
completed step (ii)′ as well.
Proposition 13. Let F ⊆ ℘(T)→ ℘(T) be the set of base functions of I. Then
SF ({ ↓τ | τ ∈ Ts }) = {↓τ | τ ∈ Ts }.
Verifier StdV is then defined as




{ ↓τ | X ⊆ ↓τ , τ ∈ Ts } (19)
is the closure operator that maps ℘(T) onto { ↓τ | τ ∈ Ts } and ρ˙s is its pointwise extension to V.
Note that 〈Ts;v∗〉 is isomorphic to { ↓τ | τ ∈ Ts } via τ 7→ ↓τ . Thus, verifier StdV can be implemented using types in
Ts rather than sets of types. Interface types are abstracted into Obj and all type checks on interface types are ignored during
the verification (and checked at run-time).
6. A parallel verifier
In this section, we define a methodology to statically verify all type errors, including interface type errors, by reusing
existing verification algorithms and data structures as much as possible.
The idea is to use StdV, defined in Section 5.3, in parallel with a set of verifiers, each one checking a single interface.
According to Sections 5.3 and 5.2, all these verifiers can be implemented using single types and thus can reuse algorithms
and data structures of existing verifiers. Indeed, existing verifiers already implement StdV.
First we introduce verifier ParV, which is the parallel composition of set of verifiers, each one checking a single interface:
ParV := n
c∈I
SubV({ [nc | n > 0 }). (20)
According to Section 5.2, whenwe check a single type we also have to keep track of the corresponding array types. Applying
Proposition 11 we have that ParV is complete wrt errors on interface types:
ParV ≡ SubV(⋃
c∈I
{ [nc | n > 0 }) = SubV({ [nc | c ∈ I, n > 0 }).
Note that each verifier in ParV can be implemented by using single types, as illustrated in Section 5.2. Instead, verifier
SubV({ [nc | c ∈ I, n > 0 }), which checks all interface types at the same time, cannot be implemented by using single
types, since its domain is not always composed of principal downsets only.
The proposedmethodology consists in performing analysis StdV ‖ ParV. Since the set of errors checked by these verifiers
cover T, Proposition 11 gives (StdV ‖ ParV) ≡ SetV.
7. An improved verifier
In this section, we improve the methodology proposed in Section 6 by eliminating the need to perform all verifications
in ParV in most cases, while still retaining ease of implementation.
First, we define an augmented Standard Verification (StdV+) that also checks for errors on interfaces types. This verifier
is as precise as StdV with respect to errors on class types, but it may lose precision for errors on interface types. The loss
of precision can be detected and ParV can be omitted when no loss of precision has occurred. Moreover, StdV+ is sound
wrt SetV, i.e., errors certified as absent by StdV+ are certified as absent by SetV also. This removes the need to perform the
verifications in ParV that check for errors already certified as absent by StdV+.
7.1. Augmented standard verification
In order to define the augmented verifier, we define, as an intermediate step, verifierDownV, which is equivalent to SetV.
Verifier DownV is defined as
DownV := 〈ρ˙d(V),E, ρ˙d ◦ next, error〉
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where ρd is an upper closure operator on ℘(T) defined as
ρd(X) =
{↓X if X 6= ∅,
↓null otherwise. (21)
Verifier DownV does not consider all sets of types, but only non-empty downsets. Intuitively, completing a set X of types by
adding all other types assignable to any type in X , does not compromise the ability to check for type errors in X . The special
case for X = ∅ is introduced here, in order to obtain simpler statements for some propositions further on. It should be clear
that ρd is indeed an upper closure operator. Monotonicity follows from the monotonicity of ↓ and the fact that ↓null ⊆ X
for all X 6= ∅. Note that both X ∪ Y and X ∩ Y are non-empty downset whenever both X and Y are non-empty downsets,
thus ρd(℘(T)) is a sub-lattice of ℘(T).
Proposition 14. For any method µ with instructions in I, it is SetVµ Pρ˙d,id DownVµ. 
Note that SetV Pρ˙d,id DownV =⇒ SetV Pid DownV, thus we get SetV ≡ DownV as claimed.
Verifier DownV still requires manipulation of sets of types, since the (precise) abstraction of the join operation in SetV,
i.e., A∪ B, is ρd(A∪ B), which may not be a principal downset even if both A and B are. To simplify the implementation, and
in particular to be able to handle single types instead of set of types, we introduce∇ : ℘(T)×℘(T)→ ℘(T) as a widening
operator [7]. For any A, B ∈ ℘(T), it is
A∇B =
{
ρd(A ∪ B) if ρd(A ∪ B) is a principal downset,
ρs(A ∪ B) otherwise. (22)
Then, we derive next∇ from ρ˙d ◦ next and ∇ in the standard way:
next∇(v) =
{
v if ρ˙d ◦ next(v)⊆˙v,
v∇˙(ρ˙d ◦ next(v)) otherwise. (23)
Thewidening operator (22) is used to approximatemissing joins in the set of principal downsets ofT. If ρd(A∪B) is already a
principal downset, then the exact value is used. Otherwise, we approximate ρd(A∪B)with a principal downset that contains
it. We choose the smallest principal downset whose top is in Ts, i.e., ρs(A ∪ B). The purpose of this definition is twofold:
• since ρd(A ∪ B) is the only possible source of non principal downsets in ρ˙d ◦ next, and we removed it by using ∇ , we
obtain a verifier that can be implemented using types in T, rather than sets of types in T; more precisely, we define
StdV+ := 〈{ ↓τ | τ ∈ T }T ,E, next∇ , error〉, (24)
and implement it via the isomorphism ↓τ 7→ τ . We recall that T is the number of items in a context vector of the
method (number of instructions times context size). It follows from a general result of abstract interpretation theory
that lfp next⊆˙lki next∇ . Note that next∇ is not monotone in general.
• when ρd(A ∪ B) is not a principal downset, A∇B is obtained by simply ignoring relations impl and extI, and thus it can
be implemented in a similar way as join is implemented in StdV. For instance, the join between two unrelated interface
types results in type Obj.
Thus, StdV+ can be implemented by operating small changes over StdV. Wrt StdV, verifier StdV+ does not always abstract
away interface types, and does not ignore type checks on them. If, for a given methodµ, ρd(A∪ B) can always be computed
precisely, then StdV+ gives the same result as DownV, which is equivalent to SetV by Proposition 14. When this is the case,
we have obtained interface types verification formethodµ at a small additional cost over standard verification. However, for
some methods, StdV+ may lose precision wrt SetV. The following proposition relates the augmented standard verification
with the set verification and with the standard verification.
Proposition 15. For all methods µ with instructions in I, we have SetVµ 6id StdV+µ Pηs StdVµ. 
Relation SetVµ 6id StdV+µ means that the set of errors found by verifier SetV on method µ is a subset of the errors signaled
by verifier StdV+ on the same method. The following corollary is a consequence of relation StdV+µ Pηs StdVµ, and states
more explicitly that any additional error signaled by StdV+ and not found by SetVmust be an error on an interface type.
Corollary 16. For all methods µ with instructions in I, we have res(StdV+µ ) \ res(SetVµ) ⊆ Ts. 
Thus, if StdV+µ signals an error on a type in Ts, then this is a real error (i.e., an error that would be found by SetVµ) and we
can reject the method µ. Otherwise, we can collect all errors on interface types signaled by StdV+µ and perform only those
verifiers in ParVµ that check for those errors.
We can avoid ParVµ altogether if no loss of precision has occurred during the execution of StdV+µ . In fact, any loss of
precision in StdV+µ can be detected during data flow analysis, as detailed in the following proposition.
Proposition 17 (Loss of Precision). Let µ be any method with instructions in I. If res(SetVµ) ⊂ res(StdV+µ ), then there exist
d ∈ I, a, b ∈ C ∪ I, c ∈ C and m > 0 such that all of the following hold:
(i) [md ∈ res(StdV+µ ) \ res(SetVµ);
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(ii) neither a v∗ b, nor b v∗ a;
(iii) ↓c = ρs({a, b});
(iv) {a, b} ⊆ ↓d;
(v) c 6v∗ d.




i )) = ↓[qa and ρd(nextkj(Ppj )) = ↓[qb;
(b) Ppk = ↓[qa and ρd(nextki(Ppi )) = ↓[qb. 
The proposition gives a set of necessary conditions that must all be fulfilled in order for loss of precision to occur. Thus,
an implementation may be confident that no precision has been lost whenever it can be proved that at least one of
the conditions is not met. Assume that there is a loss of precision for a method µ. Proposition 17 says that, during the
computation of the Kleene iteration for method µ (conditions (a) and (b)), the implementation will have to compute the
join between two unrelated types, [qa and [qb (condition (ii)). According to definition (22), these joins are computed in the
class hierarchy only, resulting in their ‘‘most derived’’ common super class, be it [qc. Conditions (iii)–(v) say that there is a
problem when both a and b implement some interface d, but c does not. We say that interface d has been lost after the join.
Thus, an implementation may check that, whenever a join between two unrelated types is computed, no interface is lost.
To check condition (i), we can collect the set S of all interfaces that are lost during the fixpoint computation. At the end of
the iteration, we can check that no type error has been found for all interfaces in S. A simpler strategy is to ignore any lost
interface that is not checked by any instruction in the method, since these interfaces obviously cannot satisfy condition (i).
7.2. The methodology
Our bytecode verification is performed according to the following algorithm:
(A) perform the augmented Standard Verification StdV+;
(B) if both loss of precision and an error on an interface type has been detected by StdV+, perform ParV;
Since StdV+ is sound wrt SetV, the absence of type errors in step A implies that there are no type errors in the method. If an
error on a class type is found in step A, then this error is also found by SetV, so we can reject the method. If an error on an
interface type is found in step A, this does not immediately imply that an error would be found by SetV, since precision may
have been lost, thus we need step B in this case. However, we can avoid step B and reject the method, instead, if we have
not detected any loss of precision. Note that, as we have explained in Section 7.1, there is no need to execute the whole of
ParVµ in step B. In fact, we only need to perform those verifiers SubV({c})where c is an error detected by StdV+.
According to the Java specification [15], starting from version number 50 of the class file format, the original type
inference algorithm [14] of the bytecode verification has been superseded by split verification. In this framework, our
methodology can be described as follows, for each method µ.
1. Fixpoint computation (at compilation time).
(a) Compute lki next∇ , recording if precision has been lost and the set S of interface types that cause errors. Add the
fixpoint as an attributeA to the class file.
(b) If precision has been lost in the previous step, compute the least fixpoint of SubV({c}) for all interfaces c ∈ S and add
them as a list of attributesAc to the classfile.
2. Lightweight verification.
(a) ReadA from the class file and check that next∇(A)⊆˙A. Reject the method ifA is missing or the previous inequality
does not hold.
(b) Compute error(A). Reject the method if error(A) contains at least an error on a class type.
(c) If we have not rejected the method, but error(A) is not empty (thus it contains only errors on interface types), read
allAc attributes for all interfaces c ∈ error(A). Reject the method if any attribute is missing.
(d) For all interfaces c ∈ error(A), check that ρ˙c ◦ next(Ac)⊆˙Ac , where ρc is defined in (17), and that Ac contains no
errors on interface c. Reject the method otherwise.
8. Implementation
In this section we describe a prototype implementation of the split verification version of our methodology, in order to
evaluate the cost of interface types verification. The implementation is not limited to the instruction set presented in Fig. 1
and can check bytecode programs written in the full JVML instruction set, subroutines excluded.2
For step 1(a) in Section 7.2, we have used the ASM Java Library [5]. In fact, actual implementations of the standard fixpoint
computation do not abstract away all interface types, but replace them with Obj only when a merge operation involving at
least one interface type is performed. This behavior is very similar to the fixpoint computation performed by verifier StdV+.
2 Recent compilers, for instance the javac included in JDK version 1.6, do not generate code containing subroutines. This construct will eventually
disappear from deployed Java code [11].













Fig. 12. The number of classes and methods verified and belonging to each benchmark.
Package Original(Kb) Annotated(Kb) Increase(%)
antlr 962 996 3.48
bloat 1499 1702 13.53
chart 4138 4707 13.75
eclipse 17525 18408 5.04
fop 9499 10543 10.99
hsqldb 1646 1784 8.34
jython 2124 2283 7.47
luindex 929 955 2.88
lusearch 929 955 2.88
pmd 4327 4848 12.03
xalan 4421 5048 14.17
Total 47999 52229 8.81
Fig. 13. Increase in size of the classfile after annotations.
For step 1(b), we have developed a tool using the Code Engineering Library (BCEL) [1] for the parsing of the bytecode. For
the present, we have not implemented the loss of precision detection, thus the tool always computes the fixpoints for all
checked interfaces.
We have fully implemented step 2 of the methodology by modifying the lightweight verifier in the OpenJDK Hotspot
JVM [21]. We refer to version 7-b34 of the OpenJDK Hotspot interpreter.
We tested our implementation on the same benchmarks and the same (default) workloads defined in the DaCapo
benchmark suite [4], version 2006–10. The suite contains eleven benchmarks representing various open-source applications.
The DaCapo tool that is included in the suite can execute a single benchmark multiple times to make the measurements
converge. We have not used the DaCapo tool directly, because this is not well suited for evaluating bytecode verification. In
fact, bytecode verification is performed onlywhen a class is loaded for the first time. The DaCapo tool uses the same instance
of the JVM for all the iterations of the benchmark, thus triggering bytecode verification only once for each used class. Instead,
we have executed each benchmark several times, restarting the JVM at each iteration. We have annotated almost all classes
of the DaCapo benchmarks. We did not annotate the classes with methods containing subroutines, because lightweight
verification does not support them.
The benchmark sizes range from the 195 classes of antlr to the more than three thousand of eclipse. Fig. 12 shows
some data for each benchmark. In the first column, we show the number of classes actually verified over the total number
of classes in the benchmark; in column 2, we show execution the same information for methods. Note that only a fraction of
the available classes are really loaded (and verified) during the execution of the DaCapo benchmarks. Only for benchmark
luindex the number of verified classes is actually bigger than the number of classes in the package. This is due to the use
of library classes which do not belong to the package.
We measured the size of the attributes added to the class files by our tool (implementing step 1(b) in Section 7.2) with
respect to the size of the original classfiles (Fig. 13). On average, the attribute increases the size of the classfile of about 9% ,
with a per benchmark increase that ranges from 3% to 14%. Note, however, that these numbers must be regarded as a worst
case, since our tool adds the attributes for allmethods,without checking if loss of precision had actually occurred in step 1(a).
We have evaluated the time performance of the lightweight verification (step 2 in Section 7.2) wrt standard lightweight
verification in the unmodified Hotspot interpreter. In particular, we instrumented the virtual machine code to measure the
time spent in the verification routines during benchmark execution. We used the clock_gettime Linux system call that
provides access to a timer with the resolution of nanoseconds. We executed each benchmark 100 times and we averaged
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Fig. 14.Verification time for the eleven benchmarks of theDaCapo suite. Times are normalizedwrt standard lightweight verification in unmodifiedOpenJDK
Hotspot.
the results. For our measurements, we used a 3.00 GHz Intel Core 2 Duo with a 6 Mb L2-cache, running Ubuntu Linux 8.04.1
(32 bit, kernel 2.6.24-21).
Fig. 14 shows, for each benchmark, the ratio of verification time of our methodology over the verification time of the
unmodified VM. The increase in verification time ranges from 4% to 52%, with a geometric mean of 25%. Note that our
verification in lusearch is apparently faster than the standard one. However, the standard deviation for the samples of
this benchmark was very high, so we think that this result is not statistically meaningful.
In each bar in Fig. 14 we have made a distinction between the contribution of steps 2(a)–(b) (in dark gray) and that of
steps 2(c)–(d) (in light gray). We can note that steps 2(c)–(d) never occur in 4 of the 11 benchmarks, and their contribution
to the total verification time is extremely low. Indeed, only 17 out of the 41000 tested methods needed to read the custom
attributes. This alsomeans that very few classes actually need annotations for interface types, thus we think that a complete
implementation of the methodology (i.e., including loss of precision detection in step 1(a)) can obtain a much smaller size
increase than the worst case represented in Fig. 13.
Most of the increase in verification time is spent in steps 2(a)–(b), where the only difference between the original Hotspot
verifier and our verifier lies in the additional checks on interface types. We have investigated the issue, and we have found
that the additional time is spent in recovering full type information for interface types, starting from their names. Since this
activity is unavoidable, given the purpose of our verification, we think that there is not much room for improvement over
the results shown in Fig. 14. Note, however, that the absolute time of verification is actually negligible, in both cases, wrt
the execution time of the benchmarks.
9. Related works
This work is based on the parallel decomposition proposed in [2]. In that article, the aim was to enable small-memory
devices to perform bytecode verification. Standard bytecode verification was decomposed into a set of sub-analyses, each
one checking for the absence of only a subset of all errors, and thus requiring less memory than the whole analysis. The
results, evaluated on a large set of benchmarks, show that required memory never exceeds 40% of the memory required by
standard verification. In that work, the starting point for the decomposition was the standard verification algorithm, while
here we start from the set based verification, and we investigate the relationship between the set-based verification and
other kinds of verifiers (including the standard one).
The formalization of bytecode verification is the subject of a wide number of papers. Here, we recall the extensive
survey [18], by Leroy, which addresses many problems raised by JVML features (object initialization, subroutines, etc.).
With regard to interfaces verification, many approaches [13,22,6] suggest to use the set-based verification to circumvent
the lack of a least common supertype. However, managing sets of types instead of single types requires an almost complete
re-implementation of existing verifiers. Split verification for a set based verifier, in particular, would probably require the
definition of a new certificate different from the existing one. Our methodology, instead, can be (and has actually been)
implemented with little effort in an incremental way over existing verifiers. From the performance point of view, we think
that there would be little difference between our methodology and a set based verifier. In fact, Fig. 14 shows that the
execution time of ParV is negligible. Moreover, the increment in execution time in the standard verifier is mainly due to
the added checks on the interface types. Clearly, the cost of these checks would be paid by a set based verifier, too.
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Knoblock and Rehof [16] suggest to complete the poset of types by using the Dedekind–MacNeille completion,
transforming it into a lattice. We have seen in Observation 10 that (in our model) this approach is equivalent to the set
based verification. Once the completion has been done, the state of each local variable and stack item is represented by a
single type instead of a set of types. Knoblock and Rehof have employed this type elaboration in the realization of a bytecode-
to-native-code compiler, but it could also be used in the verification process. The type elaboration has a cubic complexity
in the size of the program, and, according to their measures, represents approximately 4% of the total compilation time. We
cannot directly compare these results with ours, because the complete type elaboration generates alsomany data structures
used later in the compilation process. Nevertheless, both the complexity calculus and the measures in [16] suggest that the
poset completion is definitely not negligible. With our work, we do not need to complete the poset.
In a recent work [11], Gal et al. propose to put the code in single static assignment (SSA) form before verifying it. In this
way, the complex iterative dataflow analysis can be avoided in favor of a more efficient definition-use verification of local
variables and stack items. Moreover, the result of the transformation can be useful in successive just-in-time compilation
and/or optimization stages. We believe that such an approach is orthogonal to ours in that it concerns the algorithm and not
the domain of the verification.
We are unaware of any work that integrates interface type verification into the lightweight verification process.
10. Conclusions
We have formalized, implemented, and evaluated a technique for static verification of Java bytecode that includes type
checking of interfaces. We have given a formalization of a verifier that manipulates sets of types instead of single types. We
have used the technique of parallel decomposition, based on abstract interpretation, to decompose the set based verifier
into a set of simpler verifiers. We have detailed and proved the relationships among these verifiers in terms of correctness
and completeness. Then, we have introduced a methodology that uses these verifiers to add type checking of interface
types to standard verification. Finally, we have described an actual implementation of this strategy in the framework of split
verification, and we have evaluated it on a large set of benchmarks. We have found that the additional cost of the strategy is
almost entirely due to the assignability checks on interfaces; thus the strategy can be implementedwith negligible overhead.
Appendix. Proofs
This appendix contains all the proofs of the propositions and theorems in the paper. We start by proving the parallel
decomposition theorem.
Proposition (5). Let V = 〈A, B, f , g〉 and take {Vi}i∈I , where Vi = 〈Ai, Bi, fi, gi〉 for i ∈ I . If V Pηi Vi for all i ∈ I , then
V Pη fi∈I Vi, where η =∧i∈I ηi. In particular, if η = id, then fi∈I Vi ≡ V .
Proof. According to Definition 2, we have to prove that (i)
∧
i∈I Bi = η(B) and that (ii) η(res(V )) = res(
f
































The rest of the appendix is divided into four parts: the proofs of the statements regarding the Java type hierarchy and
the calculus of downsets (Section A.1), the subset-of-error decomposition (Section A.2), the standard bytecode verification
(Section A.3), and the augmented bytecode verification (Section A.4).
A.1. Java types hierarchy and downsets
We need some additional definitions. A poset 〈P;6〉 satisfies the ascending chain condition (ACC), if given any sequence
x1 6 x2 6 · · · 6 xn . . . of elements of P , there exists k > 1 such that xk = xk+1 = · · · . The descending chain condition
(DCC) is defined dually. If a poset P satisfies (ACC), then every non empty subset of P has a maximal element. Any finite
poset satisfies both (ACC) and (DCC). A join-semilattice is a poset P where x ∨ y exists for any pair of elements x, y ∈ P .
Lemma 18. Let 〈P;6〉 be a tree and take any x, y ∈ P such that neither x 6 y, nor y 6 x. Then, ↓x ∩ ↓y = ∅.
Proof. By contradiction, assume there exists z ∈ ↓x ∩ ↓y, i.e. z 6 x and z 6 y. Thus, both x and y belong to ↑z, but neither
x 6 y, nor y 6 x, contradicting the fact that ↑z is a chain. 
Lemma 19. If 〈P;6〉 is a tree that satisfies (DCC), then it is also a join-semilattice. This holds in particular if P is finite.




x r∗ y y r z
x r∗ z
Fig. 15. The reflexive transitive closure of a relation r .
Proof. Take x, y ∈ P . We have {x, y}u 6= ∅, since it contains >, so {x, y}u has a minimal element z, because of (DCC).
Let z ′ be any minimal element of {x, y}u that is different from z. By Lemma 18, z ′ cannot be incomparable with z, since
{x, y} ⊆ ↓z ∪ ↓z ′ 6= ∅, thus it must be z ′ 6 z and thus z ′ = z, due to minimality of z. Hence z = x ∨ y. 
Lemma 20. Let 〈P;6〉 be a tree which is also a join-semilattice, and take ∅ 6= X ⊆ P, X finite. Then, there exist x, y ∈ X such
that x ∨ y =∨ X.
Proof. By induction on n = |X |. It is n > 0, since X 6= ∅. If n = 1, i.e., X = {a}, then the proposition holds with
x = y = a. Assume the proposition holds for n > 1. Then, given X ⊆ P with |X | = n + 1, we can choose c ∈ X and
consider X ′ = X \ {c}. Note that both∨ X and∨ X ′ exist, since P is a join-semilattice. By the associative and commutative
property of ∨, we have∨ X = c ∨∨ X ′. By induction hypothesis, there exist a, b ∈ X ′ such that a∨ b =∨ X ′. If c 6 a∨ b,
then
∨
X = c ∨ (a ∨ b) = a ∨ b. If a ∨ b 6 c , then∨ X = c ∨ (a ∨ b) = c = c ∨ c , so we can choose x = y = c. If neither
c 6 a∨ b, nor a∨ b 6 c , we claim that c ∨ a = c ∨ b =∨ X . Let us prove that c ∨ a =∨ X only, since the other equality is
proved similarly. We note that c ∨ a and a∨ b cannot be incomparable, by Lemma 18, since a ∈ ↓(c ∨ a)∩↓(a ∨ b), and it
is not c 6 c ∨ a 6 a∨ b, by assumption. So, it must be a∨ b 6 c ∨ a. But then b 6 c ∨ a by transitivity, since b 6 a∨ b, and
finally
∨
X = c ∨ (a ∨ b) = (c ∨ a) ∨ b = c ∨ a. 
Lemma 21. Let 〈P;6〉 be a poset satisfying (ACC) and B ⊆ P. If∨ B exists, then also∨max B exists and the two are equal.
Proof. Assume
∨
B exists. Since max B ⊆ B,∨ B is an upper bound for max B. Assume u is any upper bound of max B and
take x ∈ B. The set Y := { y ∈ B | x 6 y } is not empty, since x ∈ Y . By (ACC), we get a maximal element m of Y . We claim
that m ∈ max B. Indeed, if there is m′ ∈ B such thatm′ > m, thenm′ > x by transitivity, so m′ ∈ Y and thus m′ = m by the
maximality of m in Y . Thus, we have found m ∈ max B and x 6 m 6 u. Hence u is also an upper bound for B, which means
that
∨
B 6 u. This implies that
∨
B is the least upper bound of max B, as required. 
Let us collect some basic facts about relationv.
Lemma 22. Take any τ , σ ∈ T, any b, c ∈ C ∪ I, d ∈ C.
(i) For all n > 0, if τ v σ and [nτ , [nσ are well-defined, then [nτ v [nσ .
(ii) For all n > 0, τ v [nObj ⇐⇒ τ = null or τ = [mb with m > n.
(iii) For all n > 0, if c 6= Obj and τ v [nc, then τ = null or τ = [nb with b v c.
(iv) If τ v d and d 6= Obj, then τ = null, or τ extCc.
Proof.
(i) By n applications of arr.
(ii) (⇐=). If τ = null, τ v [nObj by null. Note that [m−nb v Obj by obj, and thus [mb v [nObj by 22(i). (=⇒). By
induction on n > 0. If n = 0, then τ v Obj comes from null, ext or obj and, in all cases, τ 6= >. If τ v [n+1Obj, the
relation can only come from null (implying τ = null), or arrwith τ = [τ ′ and τ ′ v [nObj. The induction hypothesis
then gives τ ′ = null (impossible) or τ ′ = [mb with m > n. Thus, τ = [m+1b with m+ 1 > n+ 1. This completes the
proof.
(iii) By induction on n > 0. For n = 0, relation τ v [0c = c can only come from null or ext. In the former case, it must be
τ = null. In the latter case, τ ∈ C ∪ I, so that it can be written as [0τ . Relation τ v [n+1c can only come from null
(implying τ = null) or arr with τ = [τ ′ and τ ′ v [nc. The induction hypothesis gives τ ′ = null (impossible) or
τ ′ = [nbwith b v c. Thus, τ = [n+1b. 
(iv) By inspection of Fig. 9, τ v d, with d ∈ C\{Obj}, can only come fromnull or ext. If it comes fromnull, then τ = null.
Otherwise, it is (τ , d) ∈ extC ∪ extI ∪ impl. But it can only be (τ , d) ∈ extC ⊆ C × C, since d ∈ C, while extI ⊆ I× I
and impl ⊆ C × I.
And then some basic facts about relationv∗. The reflexive transitive closure r∗ of any relation r ⊆ A × A, for any set A,
is defined inductively by the rules in Fig. 15.
Lemma 23. Take any τ , σ ∈ T, any b, c ∈ C ∪ I.
(i) If τ v σ , then τ v∗ σ .
(ii) If τ v∗ null, then τ = null.
(iii) For all n > 0, if c 6= Obj and τ v∗ [nc, then τ = null or τ = [nd with d v∗ c.
(iv) For all n > 0, τ v∗ [nObj ⇐⇒ τ = null or τ = [md with m > n.
(v) For all n > 0, b v∗ c ⇐⇒ [nb v∗ [nc.
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Proof. Let us denote by τ vk σ a relation obtained by a derivation of depth k.
(i) By a simple application of reflv and transv.
(ii) By induction on k in τ vk null. Relation τ v1 null must come from reflv, thus τ = null. Relation τ vk+1 null
must come from transv with τ vk y and y v null. By inspection of Fig. 9, it can only be y = null, thus the induction
hypothesis gives the thesis.
(iii) By induction on k > 1 in τ vk [nc . If τ v1 [nc , then the relation comes from reflv and we have τ = [nc . If τ vk+1 [nc ,
then the relation comes from transv with τ vk y and y v [nc. From 22(iii) we get y = null or y = [nb with b v c .
In the former case, we have τ = null by 23(ii). In the latter case, we have y 6= Obj, so we can use the induction
hypothesis on τ vk [nb and obtain τ = null or τ = [nd with d v∗ b. Finally, from d v∗ b and b v c we get d v∗ c
using transv.
(iv) For⇐=, use 22(ii) and 23(i). The proof for =⇒ is by induction on k in τ vk [nObj. Relation τ v1 [nObj comes from
reflv, so τ = [nObj. Relation τ vk+1 [nObj comes from transvwith τ vk y and y v [nObj. By 22(ii), we get y = null
or y = [mb with m > n. If y = null, then τ = null by 23(ii). If y = [mb and b 6= Obj, 22(iii) gives y = null or
y = [nd and d v b, thus d 6= Obj. Then 22(iii) applied to τ v∗ y gives τ = null or τ = [na. If b = Obj, we can use the
induction hypothesis on τ vk [nObj and obtain τ = null or τ = [mc withm > n.
(v) (=⇒). The proof is by induction on k in b vk c. If b v1 c , then b = c and [nb = [nc and [nb v∗ [nc by reflv. If b vk+1 c ,
then b vk y and y v c , implying y ∈ C ∪ I. Thus, from 22(i) we get [ny v [nc. By induction hypothesis on b vk y,
we get [nb v∗ [ny and finally, by transv, we obtain [nb v∗ [nc . (⇐=). If c = Obj, then b v∗ Obj by obj and 23(i). If
c 6= Obj, then 23(iii) implies b v∗ c . 
We now have all the tools needed to calculate the downset of each type in T.
Proposition (6). Take c ∈ C ∪ I with c 6= Obj and n > 0. Then
(i) ↓> = T,
(ii) ↓[nc = { [nb | b v∗ c } ∪ {null},
(iii) ↓[nObj = { [mb | m > n } ∪ {null},
(iv) ↓null = {null}.
Proof.
(i) Clearly, ↓> ⊆ T. The reverse inclusion is given by top and 23(i).
(ii) Note that ↓[nc ⊆ { [nb | b v∗ c } ∪ {null} by 23(iii). Moreover, null v∗ [nc by null and 23(i). Finally,
{ [nb | b v∗ c } ⊆ ↓[nc by 23(v).
(iii) This is simply a restatement of 23(iv).
(iv) Clearly null v∗ null by reflv, thus {null} ⊆ ↓null. The reverse inclusion is given by 23(ii). 
The subsequent three corollaries follow from Proposition 6.
Corollary 24. Take c, d ∈ C ∪ I with d 6= Obj, and n > m > 0. Then ↓[nc ∩ ↓[md = ↓null.
Proof. Immediate consequence of 6(ii) and 6(iv). 
Corollary 25. Let A be an infinite subset of { ↓[nObj | n > 0 }. Then⋂ A = ↓null.
Proof. By 6(iii), {null} ⊆⋂ A. Assume now, by contradiction, that ∃τ ∈⋂ A, with τ 6= null. By 6(iii), it must be τ = [mσ
for some m > 0. But since there are at most m + 1 [nObj with 0 6 n 6 m, while A is infinite, there must be a k > m such
that ↓[kObj ∈ A, but [mσ 6∈ ↓[kObj, which is a contradiction. Thus, by 6(iv), ↓null =⋂ A. 
Corollary 26. Take c ∈ C ∪ I and n > 0. Then [−1(↓[n+1c) = ↓[nc.
Proof. We have two cases:
• If c 6= Obj, use 6(ii) to obtain [−1(↓[n+1c) = [−1({ [n+1b | b v∗ c } ∪ {null}) = { [nb | b v∗ c } ∪ {null} = ↓[nc.
• If c = Obj, use 6(iii) to obtain [−1(↓[n+1Obj) = [−1([mb | m > n + 1} ∪ {null}) = { [m−1b | m > n + 1 } ∪ {null} =
{ [m′b | m′ > n } ∪ {null} = ↓[nObj, where we have putm′ = m− 1. 
A.2. Subset-of-errors decomposition
This subsection contains the formal proofs needed for the decomposition of the verification in a set of simpler analyses,
each one checking only a subset of the errors.
Note that 〈C; ext∗C〉 is a tree by definition. The top element is Obj.
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Lemma 27. Take any b, c ∈ C, d ∈ C ∪ I.
(i) c 6= Obj and d v∗ c =⇒ d ext∗Cc and d ∈ C \ {Obj}.
(ii) b v∗ c ⇐⇒ b ext∗Cc.
(iii) For all n > 0, { [nb | b v∗ c } is a tree.
Proof.
(i) By induction on k > 1 in d vk c. If k = 1, then d = c , so the thesis holds. If d vk+1 c , then d vk y and y v c . From
22(iv) we get y = null or y extCc. We can exclude y = null, since d vk null would imply d = null by 23(ii). So
it is y extCc (and thus also y ext∗Cc). Since extC ⊆ C × C, this implies y ∈ C. It cannot be y = Obj, since Obj is the
top of 〈C; ext∗C〉 and y ext∗Cc would imply c = Obj. Thus, we can apply the induction hypothesis to d vk y and get
d ∈ C \ {Obj} and d ext∗Cy. Finally, we obtain d ext∗Cc from d ext∗Cy, y extCc and transextC .
(ii) (⇐=). By induction on k in b extkCc. If b ext1Cc , then b = c and b v∗ c by reflv. If b extk+1C c , then b extkCy and y extCc. By
induction hypothesis, b v∗ y and, by ext, y v∗ c. Thus, we get b v∗ c by transv. (=⇒). If c = Obj, then b ext∗CObj by
definition of extC . For c 6= Obj, the thesis follows from 27(i).
(iii) For n = 0, we have that 〈C;v∗〉 is isomorphic to 〈C; ext∗C〉 by 27(ii). Thus, 〈C;v∗〉 is a tree. For any n > 0, function
c 7→ [nc is an isomorphism from 〈C;v∗〉 to 〈{ [nc | c ∈ C };v∗〉 by 23(v). 
Proposition (7). Take E ⊆ T and let ηE = λQ .Q ∪ E and G = { chkτ | τ ∈ T } ∪ {∅}. Then
RG(ηE(E)) = M ({ ↓τ | τ ∈ E }).






max{ C ∈ ℘(T) | g(C) ⊆ Y }
)
.
Fix a τ ∈ T and consider the corresponding function chkτ ∈ G. Fix a Y ∈ ηE(E) = { X | X ⊆ E }. Either τ ∈ Y , or τ 6∈ Y .
If τ ∈ Y then chkτ (C) ⊆ Y is true for any C ∈ ℘(T), and max{ C ∈ ℘(T) | true } = max℘(T) = {T}. If τ 6∈ Y , then
chkτ (C) ⊆ Y iff C ⊆ ↓τ , according to definition (12). Thus, we have max{ C ∈ ℘(T) | C ⊆ ↓τ } = {↓τ } for all τ 6∈ Y .
Note that, if τ ∈ E, there exists Y = {τ } ∈ ηE(E) such that τ 6∈ Y . Finally, if g = ∅, then max{ C ∈ ℘(T) | ∅(C) ⊆
Y } = max{ C ∈ ℘(T) | ∅ ⊆ Y } = T. Note that T belongs to all Moore families of ℘(T), so there is no need to mention it
explicitly. 
Lemma 28. Take T ∈ ℘(T) and f : ℘(T)→ ℘(T) constant. Then
max{ C ∈ ℘(T) | C ⊆ T } = {T },
max{ C ∈ ℘(T) | f (C) ⊆ T } =
{{T} if f (C) ⊆ T ,
∅ otherwise.
Proof. Trivial. 
Lemma 29. Take τ ∈ T and f : ℘(T)→ ℘(T) such that f (Q ) = {σ } constant. Then:
(i) max{ C ∈ ℘(T) | C ⊆ ↓τ } = {↓τ },
(ii) max{ C ∈ ℘(T) | ∅(C) ⊆ ↓τ } = {T},
(iii) max{ C ∈ ℘(T) | f (C) ⊆ ↓τ } =
{{T} if σ v∗ τ ,
∅ otherwise.
(iv) max{ C ∈ ℘(T) | T(C) ⊆ ↓τ } =
{{T} if σ = >,
∅ otherwise.
Proof. (29(i)), (29(ii)) and (29(iii)) are immediate consequences of 28. (29(iv)) follows fromT 6⊆ ↓τ whenever τ 6= >, since
> 6∈ ↓τ . 
Lemma 30. Take c ∈ C ∪ I and n > 0. Then
(i) max{ C ∈ ℘(T) | [−1(C) ⊆ ↓[nc } = {↓[n+1c},
(ii) max{ C ∈ ℘(T) | [−1(C) ⊆ ↓> } = {↓>},
(iii) max{ C ∈ ℘(T) | [−1(C) ⊆ ↓null } = {↓null}.
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Proof. For equation (30(i)), let A = { C ∈ ℘(T) | [−1(C) ⊆ [nc }. First, we note that ↓[n+1c ∈ A by Corollary 26. Now, take
any C ∈ A. Then, for all τ ∈ C , [−1(τ ) ∈ ↓[nc. If c 6= Obj, Proposition 6(i) implies that either [−1(τ ) = null, or [−1(τ ) = [nb
for some b v∗ c. In the former case, it must be τ = null. In the latter case, it must be τ = [n+1b. In both cases, τ ∈ ↓[n+1b.
If c = Obj, then Proposition 6(ii) implies that either [−1(τ ) = null or [−1(τ ) = [mb for some b ∈ C ∪ I andm > n. In the
former case it must be τ = null. In the latter case, it must be τ = [m+1b, withm+ 1 > n+ 1. In both cases, τ ∈ ↓[n+1Obj.
Thus, we obtain C ⊆ ↓[n+1c for any c ∈ C ∪ I.
Equation 30(ii) follows trivially from the fact that ↓> = T. Equation 30(iii) follows from the fact that ↓null = {null}
and [−1C ⊆ {null} iff C ⊆ {null}. 
Together, Lemmas 30 and 29 allow us to compute complete shells wrt all base functions of I.
Proposition (9). Let c ∈ C ∪ I, n > 0 and F ⊆ ℘(T)→ ℘(T) be the set of base functions of I. Then,
(i) SF ({↓>}) = {↓>},
(ii) SF ({↓null,T}) = {↓null,T},
(iii) SF ({↓[nc,T}) = {↓[n+ic | i > 0 } ∪ {T,↓null}.
Proof. Equations (9(i)) and (9(ii)) are easy computations. For equation (9(iii)), let us compute
SF ({↓[nc,T}) = gfp(λQ .M ({↓[nc,T} ∪ RF (Q )))
using a descending (wrt⊇, thus ascending wrt⊆) Kleene sequence starting at {T} = {↓>}. In the first step, we use (29(i)),
(29(iii)) and 30(ii). We obtain R0 = RF ({T}) = {T}. Then,
S0 = M ({↓[nc,T} ∪ R0}) = {↓[nc,T}.
By (29(i)), (29(iii)), (30(i)) and 30(ii),
R1 = RF (S0) = M ({↓[nc,↓[n+1c,T}).
If τ 6= Obj, then
R1 = {↓[nc,↓[n+1c,T,↓null}
since ↓null = {null} = ↓[nc ∩ ↓[n+1c by Corollary 24. By induction on k > 0, it is easy to prove that
Sk = {↓[n+ic | 0 6 i 6 k } ∪ {T,↓null},
and hence the thesis. If c = Obj, then ↓null is introduced by the Moore closure only in the limit for k → ∞, since
{null} =⋂{ ↓[n+iObj | i > 0 } by Corollary 25. 








In particular, if {Ei}i∈I covers T, then fi∈I SubV(Ei) ≡ SetV.










Q ∪ Ei = Q ∪
⋂
i∈I
Ei = Q ∪
⋃
i∈I
Ei = ηE(Q ).
Moreover, SubV(Ei) PηEi SetV for all i ∈ I . So, by Proposition 5, we haven
i∈I
SubV(Ei) PηE SetV.
But also SubV(E) PηE SetV, so we get the thesis. The last point follows from the fact that, if E = T, then ηE(Q ) = Q ∪ T =
Q ∪ ∅ = Q , i.e., ηT = id. 
A.3. Standard verification as a decomposition
This subsection contains the proofs needed to model the Standard Bytecode Verification as a decomposition of SetV that
checks only the errors related to classes.
Proposition (12). { ↓τ | τ ∈ Ts } is a Moore family of ℘(T).
Proof. Let Q = {↓τ | τ ∈ Ts }. We have to prove thatM (Q ) = Q . SinceM is extensive, Q ⊆ M (Q ), so it suffices to prove
thatM (Q ) ⊆ Q , i.e., for any A ∈ ℘(Q ),⋂ A ∈ Q . We prove this by cases.
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Take any two elements ↓τ and ↓σ in Q . If τ v∗ σ , then ↓τ ∩ ↓σ = ↓τ ∈ Q , so the only interesting cases are
when neither τ v∗ σ , nor σ v∗ τ . This can only be the case if τ = [nc and σ = [md with either n 6= m, or c and d
unrelated (in particular, neither c , nor d, is Obj). If n 6= m, then ↓[nc ∩ ↓[md = ↓null ∈ Q by 24. If n = m, by 23(iii)
↓[nc ∩ ↓[md ⊆ { [nb | b ∈ C } ∪ {null}. We claim that ↓null = ↓[nc ∩ ↓[nd. In fact, any other [nb in the intersection
would violate 18, given the fact that { [nb | b ∈ C } is a tree by 27(iii). Now, it is easy to prove, by induction on the size of A,
that
⋂
A ∈ Q for any non empty, finite subset A of Q .
If A = ∅, then⋂ A is the top of Q , i.e. ↓> ∈ Q . If A is infinite, then, since each { [nb | b ∈ C } is finite, A must contain
at least two elements [nb and [mc with n 6= m. If there are at least two such elements with neither b, nor c , equal to Obj,
then ↓null ⊆⋂ A ⊆ ↓[nb ∩ ↓[mc = ↓null by 24. Otherwise, Amust contain an infinite subset B of { [nObj | n > 0 } and
↓null ⊆⋂ A ⊆⋂ B = ↓null ∈ Q by 25. 
Proposition (13). Let F ⊆ ℘(T)→ ℘(T) be the set of base functions of I. Then
SF ({ ↓τ | τ ∈ Ts }) = {↓τ | τ ∈ Ts }.
Proof. Let T := { ↓τ | τ ∈ Ts }. Note that T = M (T ) by Proposition 12 and compute SF (T ) using (16) and
Proposition 9. 
A.4. Properties of StdV+
This section contains the propositions (with proofs) that describe the properties of the Augmented Verifier StdV+.
Lemma 31. Let 〈P;6〉 be a poset, f : P → P monotone and X be a downset of P. If there exists Yˆ ∈ max{ Y ⊆ P | f (Y ) ⊆ X },
then Yˆ is a downset of P. Moreover, if P has a bottom⊥, f (⊥) = ⊥ and X 6= ∅, then Yˆ 6= ∅.
Proof. Let A := { Y ⊆ P | f (Y ) ⊆ X }, so that Yˆ ∈ max A. If Yˆ = ∅, then Yˆ is a downset. Otherwise, take y ∈ Yˆ , thus f (y) ∈ X .
If there is x ∈ P with x 6 y, then f (x) 6 f (y) by monotonicity of f . Since X is a downset, this implies that f (x) ∈ X . Thus,
f (Yˆ ∪{x}) ⊆ X , which means that Yˆ ∪{x} ∈ A. But Yˆ is maximal in A, thus it must be Yˆ ∪{x} ⊆ Yˆ , i.e., x ∈ Yˆ . This shows that
Yˆ is a downset. For the second part, note that⊥ ∈ X , since X is a non empty downset, thus {⊥} ∈ A, since f (⊥) = ⊥ ∈ X .
Thus it cannot be Yˆ = ∅, since ∅ ⊂ {⊥} and Yˆ is maximal. 
In the following we will use the fact that ρ ◦ η = η ◦ ρ = ρ whenever ρ and η are two closure operators on a complete
lattice C , such that ρ ismore precise than η (i.e., η(C) ⊆ ρ(C)).We denote byO(P) the family of the downsets of the partially
ordered set P .
Proposition (14). For any method µ with instructions in I, it is SetVµ Pρ˙d,id DownVµ.
Proof. Let us define the upper closure operator U on ℘(T) such that U(X) = Xu`. From order theory, we know that
U(℘(T)) = DM(T). From Observation 8 we know that U˙ is complete for error and id. Thus, completeness of ρ˙d wrt error and
id follows from the fact that ρd is more precise than U. In fact, DM(T) = U(℘(T)) ⊆ ρd(℘(T)) = O(T) \ {∅}, since every
element of DM(T) is a downset, and ∅u` = T` = {null} 6= ∅, thus ∅ 6∈ DM(T). To show that ρ˙d ◦ next = ρ˙d ◦ next ◦ ρ˙d,
we can show thatRF (ρd(℘(T))) ⊆ ρd(℘(T)), where F is the set of base functions in I. For id and for constant functions, use
Lemma 28, while for function [−1 use Lemma 31, noting that [−1 is monotone and [−1(null) = null. 
Lemma 32. Let µ be any method with instructions in I and define T := { ↓τ | τ ∈ T }. If next∇µ : V→ V is defined as in (23),
then next∇µ(T Tµ)⊆˙T Tµ .
Proof. Trivial consequence of definitions (23) and (22). 
According to Lemma 32 and by induction on the number of iterates, each iteration of the Kleene sequence of next∇ is
a vector of elements drawn from T := { ↓τ | τ ∈ T }, thus StdV+ gives the same result as (i.e., is equivalent to)
〈ρ˙d(V),E, next∇ , error〉, which is the verifier obtained from DownV and ∇ .
Lemma 33. Let µ be any method with instructions in I and {Sn}n>0, {Pn}n>0 be the Kleene sequences of StdVµ and StdV+µ ,
respectively. It is Sn = ρ˙s(Pn) for all n > 0.
Proof. In the following, we will use the fact that ρd is more precise than ρs, since every element in ρs(℘(T)) is a principal
downset, and thus a non empty downset.
We have S0 = 〈↓null, . . .↓null〉 = P0 = ρ˙s(P0). Let us now assume that Sn = ρ˙s(Pn). We have to show that
Sn+1 = ρ˙s(Pn+1), i.e., ρ˙s(next(Sn)) = ρ˙s(next∇(Pn)). If ρ˙d(next(Pn))⊆˙Pn, then Pn+1 = next∇(Pn) = Pn. Moreover
ρ˙d(next(Pn))⊆˙Pn
=⇒ ρ˙s(ρ˙d(next(Pn)))⊆˙ρ˙s(Pn) (by monotonicity of ρ˙s)
=⇒ ρ˙s(next(Pn))⊆˙ρ˙s(Pn) (since ρd is more precise than ρs)
=⇒ ρ˙s(next(ρ˙s(Pn)))⊆˙ρ˙s(Pn) (by completeness of ρ˙s wrt next)
=⇒ ρ˙s(next(Sn))⊆˙Sn (by induction hypothesis)
=⇒ Sn+1 ⊆ Sn (by definition).
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Since {Sn}n>0 is an increasing chain, the last inequality implies Sn+1 = Sn. Thus, we have Sn+1 = Sn = ρ˙s(Pn) = ρ˙s(Pn+1)
whenever ρ˙d(next(Pn))⊆˙Pn. Assume now that the latter is false, so that Pn+1 = next∇(Pn) = Pn∇˙(ρ˙d(next(Pn)). Let
X := ρ˙d(Pn∪˙ρ˙d(next(Pn))). If Xj is a principal downset, then Pn+1j = Xj, otherwise Pn+1j = ρs(Xj) (by (22)). In both cases,
ρs(Pn+1j ) = ρs(Xj), for all 0 6 j < T , by the idempotency of ρs. Thus, we have
ρ˙s(Pn+1) =ρ˙s(ρ˙d(Pn∪˙ρ˙d(next(Pn))) (by the considerations above)
=ρ˙s(Pn∪˙ρ˙d(next(Pn)) (since ρd is more precise than ρs)
=ρ˙s(ρ˙s(Pn)∪˙ρ˙s(ρ˙d(next(Pn)))) (by completeness of ρs wrt ∪)
=ρ˙s(ρ˙s(Pn)∪˙ρ˙s(next(Pn))) (since ρd is more precise than ρs)
=ρ˙s(ρ˙s(Pn)∪˙ρ˙s(next(ρ˙s(Pn)))) (by completeness of ρs wrt next)
=ρ˙s(Sn∪˙ρ˙s(next(Sn))) (by induction hypothesis)
=ρ˙s(Sn∪˙Sn+1) (by definition of iterates)
=ρ˙s(Sn+1) (since {Sn}n>0 is an increasing chain)
=Sn+1.
The last equality holds, because Sn ∈ ρ˙s(V) for all n > 0. 
Proposition (15). For all methods µ with instructions in I, it is SetVµ 6id StdV+µ Pηs StdVµ.
Proof. For SetV 6id StdV+, note that res(SetV) = res(DownV) ⊆ res(StdV+) by Proposition 14 and Lemma 32. For
StdV+ Pηs StdV, first note that, by Lemma 33 and continuity of ρ˙s we have










) = ρ˙s(lki (next∇)). (∗)
Now, we have
ηs(res(StdV
+)) = ηs(error(lki (next∇))) (by definition of res for StdV+)
= ηs(error(ρ˙s(lki (next∇)))) (by completeness of ηs and ρ˙s wrt error)
= ηs(error(lki (ρ˙s ◦ next))) (by (∗) above)
= res(StdV) (by definition of res for StdV). 
Corollary (16). For all methods µ with instructions in I, it is res(StdV+µ ) \ res(SetVµ) ⊆ Ts.
Proof. By Proposition 15 we know that ηs(res(StdV+)) = res(StdV), while, by construction of StdV, we know that
res(StdV) = ηs(res(SetV)). So, if we let D := res(StdV+) \ res(SetV), so that res(StdV+) = res(SetV) ∪ D, we have
res(SetV) ∪ Ts = ηs(res(SetV)) = ηs(res(StdV+)) = res(SetV) ∪ D ∪ Ts.
Since D ⊆ res(SetV)) by definition, it must be D ⊆ Ts, as required. 
Lemma 34. Let ∅ 6= B ⊆ C ∪ I and A := { [na | a ∈ B }. If B ∩ I 6= ∅, then ρs(A) = ↓[nObj, otherwise ρs(A) = ↓[nc, where
c :=∨ B is computed in 〈C; ext∗C〉.
Proof. We know that ρs(A) = ↓τ , with τ ∈ Ts. Moreover, A ⊆ ↓τ and ↓τ ⊆ ↓σ for all σ such that A ⊆ ↓σ .
By 6(iii), we have A ⊆ ↓[nObj, so it must be ↓τ ⊆ ↓[nObj, i.e., (by 6(iii) again) τ = null or τ = [mb, for some b ∈ C∪I
and m > n. Since B 6= ∅, there exist [na ∈ A for some a ∈ B. Thus ↓null ⊂ ↓[na ⊆ ↓τ (by 6(ii), 6(iv) and definition of τ )
allows us to exclude τ = null, so it is τ = [mb with m > n and b ∈ C ∪ I. Now, either b = Obj or b 6= Obj. If b = Obj,
from [na ∈ A ⊆ ↓[mb and 6(iii) we get m 6 n, thus m = n. The same conclusion follows from [na ∈ A ⊆ ↓[mb and 6(ii) if
b 6= Obj. Thus, τ = [nb for some b ∈ C ∪ I.
Assume B ∩ I 6= ∅ and take [nd ∈ A, with d ∈ I. It cannot be b 6= Obj. Otherwise, from 6(ii) and [nd ∈ A ⊆ ↓[nb we
would get d v∗ b. But then 27(i) would imply d ∈ C \{Obj}, which is impossible since d ∈ I. Thus it is b = Obj, as required.
Now assume B∩ I = ∅, i.e., B ⊆ C. Since 〈{ [na | a ∈ C };v∗〉 is isomorphic to 〈C; ext∗C〉 by 23(v) and 27(ii) and, further,
σ v∗ τ ⇐⇒ ↓σ ⊆ ↓τ , we have that c :=∨ B computed in 〈C; ext∗C〉 is such that ↓[nc is the required least upper bound
of A in ρs(℘(T)). Note that c exists by Lemma 19, since 〈C; ext∗C〉 is a finite tree. 
Proposition (17). Letµ be any method with instructions in I. If res(SetVµ) ⊂ res(StdV+µ ), then there exist d ∈ I, a, b ∈ C ∪I,
c ∈ C and m > 0 such that all of the following hold:
(i) [md ∈ res(StdV+µ ) \ res(SetVµ);
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(ii) neither a v∗ b, nor b v∗ a;
(ii) ↓c = ρs({a, b});
(iv) {a, b} ⊆ ↓d;
(v) c 6v∗ d.




i )) = ↓[qa and ρd(nextkj(Ppj )) = ↓[qb;
(b) Ppk = ↓[qa and ρd(nextki(Ppi )) = ↓[qb.
Proof. Let {Sn}n>0 be the Kleene sequence of SetVµ and S := lfp (next) = ⋃˙n>0Sn. Let also P := lfp (next∇) = ⋃˙n>0Pn.
Note that
Sn⊆˙ρ˙d(Sn)⊆˙Pn
for all n > 0, because of the extensivity of ρ˙d and the fact that the Kleene sequence of StdV+ is obtained from the Kleene
sequence of DownV through a widening operator.
Take σ ∈ error(P) \ error(S). By Corollary 16, it must be σ ∈ Ts, i.e., σ = [mdwith d ∈ I andm > 0.
Now, let us consider the upper closure operator ξ on E such that ξ(Q ) = Q ∪ {[md} and verifier
SetV Pδ˙,ξ SubV({[md}) := 〈δ˙(V), ξ(E), δ˙ ◦ next, ξ ◦ error〉.
Clearly δ˙(Sn)⊆˙δ˙(Pn) for all n > 0 by monotonicity of δ˙, and thus also δ˙(S)⊆˙δ˙(P). We claim that δ˙(S)⊂˙δ˙(P). In fact, assume
by contradiction that δ˙(S) = δ˙(P). Then,
ξ(error(S)) = ξ(error(δ˙(S))) = ξ(error(δ˙(P))) = ξ(error(P))
by completeness of δ˙ and ξ wrt error. But
ξ(error(S)) = error(S) ∪ {[md} = {[md}
since [md 6∈ error(S), while
ξ(error(P)) = error(P) ∪ {[md} = T
since [md ∈ error(P).
Note that δ˙(P0) = 〈↓null, . . . ,↓null〉 = δ˙(S0), so there must be a p > 0 such that δ˙(Pn) = δ˙(Sn) for all 0 6 n 6 p, but
δ˙(Sp+1)⊂˙δ˙(Pp+1) (otherwise δ˙(P)would be equal to δ˙(S) by continuity of δ˙).
Take 0 6 k < T such that δ(Sp+1k ) ⊂ δ(Pp+1k ). By Lemma 33 and SetV Pρ˙s,ηs StdV we know that ρs(Pp+1k ) = ρs(Sp+1k ).
Clearly, δ(Sp+1k ) ⊂ ↓> and it cannot be δ(Sp+1k ) = ↓null, since this would require Sp+1k ⊆ ↓null and then we would have
↓null ⊆ Pp+1k ⊆ ρs(Pp+1k ) = ρs(Sp+1k ) ⊆ ρs(↓null) = ↓null
and thus Pp+1k = Sp+1k . So, it is δ(Sp+1k ) = ↓[qd for some q > m. This forces δ(Pp+1k ) = ↓>.
By Lemma 32, it is Pp+1k = ↓τ for some τ ∈ T. It cannot be τ = null, since δ(↓null) = ↓null 6= ↓>. Note that
Sp+1k ⊆ δ(Sp+1k ), thus
Pp+1k ⊆ ρs(Pp+1k ) = ρs(Sp+1k ) ⊆ ρs(↓[qd) = ↓[qObj.
So (by 6(iii)) it is τ = [q′c with q′ > q and c ∈ C ∪ I. We claim that q′ = q. To show that this is indeed the case, note
that from Sp+1k ⊆ ↓[qd and Sp+1k ⊆ Pp+1k = ↓[q
′
c we get Sp+1k ⊆ ↓[qd ∩ ↓[q
′
c . Now, if it were q′ > q, Corollary 24
would force Sp+1k ⊆ ↓null, and we have shown before that this is not so. Thus it is q′ = q as claimed. This also implies
that c 6v∗ d, since otherwise it would be [qc v∗ [qd (by 23(v)) and thus also Pp+1k = ↓[qc ⊆ ↓[qd which would imply
δ(Pp+1k ) ⊆ δ(↓[qd) = ↓[qd in contradiction with δ(Pp+1k ) = ↓>.
Now let us try to compute Pp+1 = next∇(Pp). We claim that ρ˙d(next(Pp)) ˙6⊆ Pp. Assume the contrary: then Pp+1 = Pp,
but this is impossible, since we would then have
δ˙(Pp+1) = δ˙(Pp) = δ˙(Sp) ⊆ δ˙(Sp+1),
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whichwould imply δ˙(Pp+1) = δ˙(Sp+1) against our choice for p. So, it is Pp+1 = Pp∇˙ρ˙d(next(Pp)), and this holds in particular




= δ(Ppk ∪ (ρ˙d(next(Pp)))k) (since δ is more precise than ρd)
= δ(δ(Ppk ) ∪ δ(ρ˙d(next(Pp)))k) (by completeness of δ wrt ∪)
= δ(δ(Ppk ) ∪ (δ˙(next(Pp)))k) (since ρd is more precise than δ)
= δ(δ(Ppk ) ∪ δ˙(next(δ˙(Pp)))k) (by completeness of δ˙ wrt next)
= δ(δ(Spk ) ∪ δ˙(next(δ˙(Sp)))k) (by choice of p)
= δ(δ(Spk ) ∪ (δ˙(next(Sp)))k) (by completeness of δ˙ wrt next)
= δ(δ(Spk ) ∪ δ(Sp+1k )) (by def. of iterates and pointwise ext.)
= δ(δ(Sp+1k )) (since {Sn}n>0 is ascending and δ is monotone)
= δ(Sp+1k ) (since δ is idempotent).
Since we know that δ(Pp+1k ) 6= δ(Sp+1k ), this means that A cannot be a principal downset, since otherwise it would be
Pp+1k = A by (22), and this would imply δ(Pp+1k ) = δ(A) = δ(Sp+1k ). Thus, there must be at least two distinct maximal
elements in A, and ↓[qc = Pp+1k = ρs(A) by (22). Since A ⊆ δ(A) = δ(Sp+1k ) = ↓[qd, all elements of A must be of the
form [qx for some x ∈ ↓d. Then, by Lemma 34, we obtain that ρs(A) is either c = Obj, in case [qe ∈ A for some e ∈ I, or
c = ∨{ x ∈ C | [qx ∈ A } (computed in 〈C; ext∗C〉). In the former case, by (ACC), there is also a maximal [qe ∈ A such that
e ∈ I, so we choose a = [qe and any other [qb ∈ max A. In the latter case, we have [qc = ∨ A = ∨max A by Lemma 21
and, by Lemma 20, we can choose [qa, [qb ∈ max A such that c = a ∨ b. Finally, since we have found that Pp+1k ∈ ρs(℘(T)),
it must also be c ∈ C. Thus, we have found a, b, c , d andm that satisfy all conditions (i)–(v). Moreover, from the expression
for A above, we conclude that [qa and [qb must either both come from ρ˙d(next(Pp)), or one from Ppk and the other from
ρ˙d(next(Pp)). Since they are maximal in A and, moreover, the only source for non principal downset in ρ˙d ◦next is set union,
we can always find 0 6 i, j < Tµ that, together with p, q and k, satisfy condition (a) or condition (b) (possibly by renaming
a as b and vice versa). 
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